Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Camille Cameron

2006

Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class
Action Litigation in Australia
Bernard Murphy
Camille Cameron, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/camille-cameron/9/

— Class Action Litigation — version 1.5 — page 399 of 42 —

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE EVOLUTION OF CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION IN AUSTRALIA
BERNARD MURPHY∗ AND CAMILLE CAMERON†
[The federal and Victorian class action regimes are intended to facilitate aggregation of multiple
claims. Aggregation can improve efficiency by combining similar claims and can enhance access to
justice by providing a mechanism to litigate small claims. This article considers whether these
efficiency and access aims are being achieved. The authors argue that whilst some developments in
class action jurisprudence have been consistent with these legislative aims, other have not. Several
features of Australian class action jurisprudence and practice have hampered the healthy development of the legislative regimes, including adverse costs orders, unclear threshold requirements,
evasive posturing and unresolved class communication issues. Finally, having identified these
difficulties, the authors propose reform possibilities and priorities.]
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I INTRODUCTION
Class action litigation has developed gradually in Australia since the introduction of Federal Court grouped proceedings legislation some 15 years ago.1 Initial
low levels of interest — no doubt the product of unfamiliarity with the nature,
purpose and potential of the new type of action — have gradually given way to
increased use. Notwithstanding this evolution, class action litigation in Australia
is still young and the case law is still developing.
This article considers the evolution of class action litigation from the perspective of those wishing to bring or to join such an action. We argue that although
some developments have been positive, significant obstacles remain for class
action applicants. The purposes of this article are to identify those obstacles, to
explain why they are inconsistent with the aims of class action legislation, to
describe their impact on the development of the class action regime in Australia,
and to make recommendations for reform.
One source of difficulty for applicants is departure in some judicial decisions
from the aims of class action legislation. There is little doubt about what those
aims are; an examination of parliamentary debates, the Law Reform Commission
report that recommended enactment, 2 judicial decisions since enactment,
academic literature, and the legislation itself reveals general agreement. The
legislation was intended to provide a mechanism that promotes efficiency
through aggregation of claims, enabling the pursuit of legitimate claims by
people who might not otherwise be able to do so. Notwithstanding this general
agreement, some decisions are in effect inconsistent with the intent of the
legislation. These decisions have had negative consequences for class action
applicants and have hampered the development of a healthy class action regime.
Another factor that has contributed to the difficulties faced by class action
applicants in Australia is a tendency to assume that traditional civil procedure
rules, attitudes and practices can be relied upon to determine the way in which
class actions are conducted. This tendency is primarily the result of a conception
of civil liability that focuses on compensation and legal representation of
individual plaintiffs rather than on large classes of plaintiffs. Several concerns
underlie such an individualised conception of civil justice. Broadly, they stem
from a perceived need to discourage ‘entrepreneurial litigation’ and a ‘United
States-style litigation explosion’, as well as views that equate class action
lawyers with ‘ambulance chasers’ and suspicion of any litigation funding
arrangement that departs from traditional practices.
Part II of this article briefly explains the intent of the class action legislation.
In Part III, we consider several prevailing attitudes about class actions and
explain why they impede the development of the class action jurisdiction. We
then identify and analyse, in Part IV, specific features of class action litigation in
Australia that create unwarranted obstacles for class action applicants. To this
end, we consider why such obstacles exist and offer suggestions as to how their
1 See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA (‘Federal Court Act’).
2 Law Reform Commission, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court, Report No 46 (1988).
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adverse impact upon access to justice can most effectively be addressed. In
Part V we consider the growing role of institutional litigation funders in Australian class action litigation. The debate that has accompanied this development
reflects many of the themes we explore in this article, including suspicion of
alternative funding models and fear of entrepreneurial litigation. However, we
note with encouragement judicial comments that endorse the need to embrace
new rules and models for the funding and conduct of class actions in Australia.
Class actions are political in the sense that they are a public example of large
numbers of ordinary citizens — whether they be consumers, shareholders, cartel
victims or others — in conflict with large corporations or government. They
bring to the fore fundamentally differing views about the nature and proper
boundaries of civil litigation and the roles of key players in that system, especially judges, lawyers, parties, large corporations and the state.
We endorse a liberal approach to interpreting the legislation on which the
federal and Victorian class action regimes are based and because of this have
chosen to write this article from the perspective of class action applicants. We
argue that some of the developments in class action litigation and jurisprudence
are inconsistent with the access to justice and efficiency aims of that legislation.
It is our intention that this article might encourage debate about the health of
Australian class action regimes and about reform priorities.
II T H E O R I G I N S A N D P U R P O S E S O F C L A S S A C T I O N
PROCEEDINGS IN AUSTRALIA
A History
The first Australian class action regime was enacted in 1992, though representative procedures themselves were not new. Such procedures have existed in
English rules of court since 1883,3 and were given broader application in 1901.4
In Australia, these procedures found expression in the rules of court of the
Australian states and territories.5 However, with few exceptions, they were not
given a liberal interpretation and fell into disuse. 6 The inadequacy of these
procedures led to inquiries by government-funded law reform bodies, and
ultimately to the current Australian class action regime.7
In 1988, a report by the Law Reform Commission (now the Australian Law
Reform Commission (‘ALRC’)) entitled Grouped Proceedings in the Federal
3 See Rules of the Supreme Court 1883 (UK) O 16 r 9, which provided that ‘where there are

4
5
6

7

numerous persons having the same interest in one course or matter, one or more of such persons
may sue or be sued … on behalf or for the benefit of all persons so interested’, as cited in M D
Chalmers and M Muir MacKenzie, Wilson’s Supreme Court of Judicature Act (4th ed, 1883) 222.
See Duke of Bedford v Ellis [1901] AC 1.
See, eg, Supreme Court Rules 1957 (Vic) O 16 r 9.
See, eg, Temperton v Russell [1893] 1 QB 435; Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd
[1910] 2 KB 1021; John v Rees [1970] Ch 345; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1981] Ch 229; R J Flowers Ltd v Burns [1987] 1 NZLR 260; Carnie v Esanda Finance
Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398.
See, eg, Law Reform Committee of South Australia, Report Relating to Class Actions, Report
No 36 (1977); Law Reform Commission, above n 2.
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Court was tabled in federal Parliament. 8 Following debate, the class action
regime now found in Part IVA of the Federal Court Act was enacted and took
effect on 5 March 1992. A similar regime relating to class action proceedings
commenced in Victoria was passed by the Victorian Parliament; this is found in
the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) Part 4A, and took effect from 1 January 2000.
Because most Australian class action litigation has been conducted in the Federal
Court, the emphasis of this article is on the Commonwealth legislation and on
cases decided pursuant to that legislation. However, the federal and Victorian
class action regimes are for all present purposes identical, and accordingly our
analysis applies equally to both Acts.
B Purposes
The policy and purposes underlying Part IVA of the Federal Court Act were
identified in the second reading speech for the Bill that introduced it:
The Bill gives the Federal Court an efficient and effective procedure to deal
with multiple claims. Such a procedure is needed for two purposes. The first is
to provide a real remedy where, although many people are affected and the total amount at issue is significant, each person’s loss is small and not economically viable to recover in individual actions. It will thus give access to the
courts to those in the community who have been effectively denied justice because of the high cost of taking action.
The second purpose of the Bill is to deal efficiently with the situation where the
damages sought by each claimant are large enough to justify individual actions
and a large number of persons wish to sue the respondent. The new procedure
will mean that groups of persons, whether they be shareholders or investors, or
people pursuing consumer claims, will be able to obtain redress and do so more
cheaply and efficiently than would be the case with individual actions.9

1

Access to Justice
The second reading speech confirms that promoting access to justice is a
central aim of the class action regime. The regime was established with the
intention of providing a mechanism for individual citizens to seek redress
through the courts for civil wrongs committed by governments, corporations and
other defendants that are usually more powerful than any individual claimant.
The availability of such a mechanism is of increasing importance in a global
economy in which civil wrongs are often committed on a mass scale by large and
powerful entities. These entities enjoy the advantages that accrue in litigation
and dispute resolution to those with ‘deep pockets’ and the status of ‘repeat
8 Law Reform Commission, above n 2.
9 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 November 1991, 3174

(Michael Duffy, Attorney-General). Similar comments have been made in the Victorian legislature in relation to that state’s class action regime: see Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 4 October 2000, 429, 430–2 (M R Thomson, Minister for Small Business). For
recent judicial consideration of the purposes of Federal Court Act pt IVA, see Dorajay Pty
Ltd v Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394, 422–3 (Stone J) (‘Aristocrat’). This case is discussed
below in Part IV(C).
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players’. 10 In his classic statement about the power and resource advantages
enjoyed by repeat players 11 over ‘one-shotters’ 12 in litigation, Marc Galanter
describes the negative impact of this power imbalance upon the capacity of
citizens to obtain effective redress in courts.13 Galanter identifies the class action
as a mechanism capable of addressing this problem. In his view, because the
class action enables individuals to aggregate their claims, it can reduce power
imbalances between repeat players and one-shotters.14
This rebalancing is clearly one aim of the legislation. It is intended to create
power in numbers that would be non-existent if claims were pursued individually, and to provide a mechanism that ensures that a greater number of those
claims will be litigated. Judicial comments about the role of commercial litigation funders in class action litigation have underscored this power balance
issue. 15 There has also been judicial acknowledgement that the class action
mechanism makes it possible to pursue legitimate claims arising from mass
wrongs that would not be addressed if individuals were left to seek a remedy on
their own.16

10 Marc Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal

11

12

13
14

15

16

Change’ (1974) 9 Law and Society Review 95, 97, where the author describes ‘one-shotters’ as
‘those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts’, and ‘repeat players’ as those
‘who are engaged in many similar litigations over time’.
Ibid 98. Galanter refines the definition of repeat player to an ‘“ideal type” … a unit which has
had and anticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and
which has the resources to pursue its long-run interests’. However, Galanter observes that repeat
players will not necessarily exhibit all the features of this ideal type: at 98. For example, in the
context of mass tort class actions, there will be some situations in which a typical repeat player
— such as an asbestos manufacturer or a tobacco company — might have high stakes in a particular case because of the disastrous financial consequences of a loss.
Ibid. Galanter’s one-shotter will usually be a smaller unit than a repeat player and ‘his claims
may be so small and unmanageable … that the cost of enforcing them outruns any promise of
benefit’: at 98. Applicants in a mass tort class action will not exhibit all the features of typical
one-shotters, because of the capacity of the class action mechanism to narrow the power gap
between applicants and respondents. It does this, for example, by giving applicants the power
that comes from strength in numbers and access to experienced class action lawyers who, because of their experience, might themselves exhibit some of the features of repeat players.
Ibid 97–8, where the author argues that it is best to think of the one-shotter and repeat player
categories as a ‘continuum rather than as a dichotomous pair’.
See ibid 150–1 (citations omitted): ‘The intensity of the opposition to class action legislation …
indicates the “haves” own estimation of the relative strategic impact of [class action proceedings]’. Galanter cites an official who supported Governor Ronald Reagan’s veto of the California
Legal Assistance programme: ‘What we’ve created … is an economic leverage equal to that of a
large corporation. Clearly that should not be’: at 151 fn 144.
See, eg, Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 203, 226
(Mason P) (‘Fostif Appeal’). His Honour also commented on ‘deep-pocketed and determined
defendants’ and the ability of litigation funders ‘to make the forensic decisions necessary to deal
with determined and well-informed opponents’: at 235.
See also below Part IV(A) for a discussion on the tactics of delay and attrition.
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2

The Regulatory Role of Class Actions
The role of private litigation and tort law as regulatory tools has long been
recognised.17 This is also true of class actions, as the Law Reform Commission
has acknowledged:
Enabling people to have increased access to legal remedies in court proceedings could render the substantive law more enforceable and thus encourage a
greater degree of compliance with laws the purpose of which is to prevent or
discourage activities which cause loss or injury to others. This is an important
consequence of any change in procedural remedies. Respect for the law should
be enhanced if access to remedies is facilitated.18

One example of the regulatory role of class action legislation is the rise of
shareholder securities class actions in Australia. These actions are widely viewed
as a form of ‘private enforcement’ — a method of regulating business entities
that exists alongside the provisions of corporate and consumer legislation. 19
Securities class actions are now well established in the United States and Canada
and are steadily developing in Australia. They provide shareholders with a
practical mechanism to recover compensation from corporations and their
officers for breaches of the law that cause shareholders to lose money. By
contrast, the regulatory regimes operate to penalise corporations and their
officers who breach the law, but do not usually operate to compensate shareholders for their losses.
In this way, shareholder class actions contribute to a culture of good corporate
governance. For example, Jeremy Cooper, the Deputy Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) has stated that shareholder
class actions have a useful role to play in ‘maintaining the integrity of the equity
capital market.’ 20 The Australian Shareholders’ Association Ltd (‘ASA’) has
17 This understanding has led to the label of ‘private Attorneys-General’ being applied by some

observers to those who bring class actions. See, eg, Peta Spender, ‘Securities Class Actions: A
View from the Land of the Great White Shareholder’ (2002) 31 Common Law World Review
123, 124; Deborah R Hensler et al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private
Gain (2000) 71–3; Barry Lipp, ‘Mass Tort Class Actions under the Federal Court of Australia
Act: Justice for All or Justice Denied?’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 361, 364. For
examples of concerns about the role of ‘litigation as a governance tool’, see Deborah R Hensler,
‘Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation’ (2001) 11 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 179, 211–2.
18 Law Reform Commission, above n 2, 33.
19 Spender, above n 17. See also John C Coffee Jr, ‘The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago
Law Review 877.
20 Jeremy Cooper, Deputy Chairman, ASIC, ‘Corporate Wrongdoing: ASIC’s Enforcement Role’
(Paper presented at the International Class Actions Conference, Melbourne, 2 December 2005)
15 <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ICAC2005_speech_021205.pdf/
$file/ICAC2005_speech_021205.pdf>, where Cooper commented that:
ASIC cautiously welcomes the emergence of the shareholder class action in Australia as a
‘self help’ mechanism whereby shareholders are able to seek damages for loss incurred at the
hands of directors and advisers who negligently or dishonestly cause loss to those shareholders. …
Vigilant shareholders and a vigorous, but appropriately balanced, shareholder class action
landscape, will play an important part in maintaining the integrity of the equity capital market
in years to come.
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provided further support for such a role in a recent letter to the Federal Court that
requested an expedited hearing application in a shareholder class action.21
The regulatory role of class action litigation in Australia has also recently been
discussed in the context of institutional litigation funders. This issue is considered in Part V below.
C The Present Situation
The federal and Victorian class action regimes share many features that promote the policy and objectives of class action litigation. Nevertheless, the ability
of claimants to obtain redress is still limited in ways not contemplated by the
legislation. For example, there are only two firms in Australia that frequently act
for applicants in this area — even though the procedure has been available for
over 14 years. Given the ability of lawyers to locate and practise in profitable
areas, this is a good indicator of how difficult it is to run class action litigation.
One reason for these problems is the perpetuation of several fears about class
action — fears which, in our view, are unsubstantiated.
III S O M E R E C U R R I N G F E A R S A B O U T C L A S S A C T I O N L I T I G AT I O N
A Fear of ‘Entrepreneurial Litigation’
A recurrent concern directed at class actions is that they are opening the door
to entrepreneurial litigation. Class actions, it is said, provide a gateway to a
proliferation of predatory litigation run by opportunistic class action lawyers.
These comments are often accompanied by concerns about the dangers of United
States-style litigation, in whose jurisdiction such litigation is said to be endemic.22 These concerns indicate a failure to appreciate how class actions work;
The regulatory role of securities class actions has recently been a recurring theme in the
Australian print media: see, eg, Marcus Priest, ‘Class Actions Put Heat on Executives’, The
Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 8 July 2005, 56. This has been especially so in the wake
of class actions against GIO Australia Holding Ltd (‘GIO’): King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd
[2000] FCA 1543 (Unreported, Wilcox, Lehane and Merkel JJ, 1 November 2000); and Aristocrat Leisure Ltd: Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394.
21 Letter from Stuart Wilson (Chief Executive Officer, ASA) to the Associate to the Presiding
Judge (Federal Court of Australia), 12 October 2005. The ASA stated in its letter that:
We consider that the protections afforded to potential investors in shares against:
• the omission of information from a prospectus; and
• misleading or deceptive statements in a prospectus;
by sections 710, 728 and 729 of the Corporations Act 2001 are critical to the interests of
shareholders and potential shareholders, and to the proper operation of the Australian capital
market. …
Given the vast sums of money that are regularly raised on the ASX by use of prospectus type
documents, and the interest of the many tens of thousands of potential investors who rely upon
them in making decisions as to whether to purchase shares, we consider that the appeal in this
matter is of real public importance and respectfully request that its hearing be expedited.
See Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Ltd (2005) 147 FCR 434 for the
outcome of the appeal.
22 See, eg, Craig Phillips, ‘Class Actions — Quo Vadis? The Case for Restriction of Expansion’
(Paper presented at the Corporate Law Conference, Melbourne, 24 September 1998) [7.1]–[7.4],
as cited in ALRC, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice System, Report
No 89 (2000) 477–8 fn 249. See also Public Interest Advocacy Centre for Coalition for Class
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indeed, they are contrary to the very notion of the modern class action. The
potential consequences of this antipathy were recognised by Justice Stephen
Charles in 1996, when his Honour stated:
Class actions are unlikely to flourish in Australia without a change in attitudes,
both in the profession and the judiciary. … Many Australian judges may still
view class actions as predatory litigation instituted for the advantage of entrepreneurial lawyers.23

Fear of entrepreneurial litigation is also evident in the following comments of
Callinan J, which his Honour made when considering the constitutional validity
of the Victorian class action legislation:
The question here is not whether, by their nature, group or class proceedings
are oppressive to defendants, give rise to entrepreneurial litigation, in fact proliferate and prolong court proceedings, undesirably substitute private for public
law enforcement or are contrary to the public interest, with disadvantages outweighing a public interest in enabling persons who have been damnified but
who would not, or could not bring the proceedings themselves, to be compensated for their losses. The question simply is whether the Victorian Act is valid.
…
[T]he problems to which I have just referred are likely to be aggravated by the
increasingly competitive entrepreneurial activities of lawyers undertaking the
conduct of class or group actions, in which, in a practical sense, the lawyers are
often as much the litigants as the plaintiffs themselves, and with the same or
even a greater stake in the outcome than any member of a group. This reality is
likely to be productive of a multiplicity of group actions throughout the country.24

A similar sentiment was expressed by Spender J during an application to strike
out pleadings in Philip Morris (Australia) Pty Ltd v Nixon.25 His Honour offered
as possible characterisations of the case, ‘the Ben Hur of ambulance chasing’ and
‘the big Ben Hur extravaganza’.26
Concerns about entrepreneurial litigation do not appear to have any empirical
foundation. Lawyers have been making money from litigation for a long time —

23
24
25
26

Actions (NSW), Representative Proceedings in NSW: A Review of the Law and a Proposal for
Reform (1995) 25, as cited in ALRC at 477–8 fn 249; A Burrell and N Reece, ‘Law Firms Duel
for the Supremacy of a Class Act’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 16 July 1999, 26;
Lucinda Schmidt, ‘The Writ Stuff’, Business Review Weekly (Melbourne), 23 July 1999, 64.
Justice Stephen Charles, ‘Class Actions in Australia’ (Paper presented at the Australian Bar
Association Conference, San Francisco, 18 August 1996).
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1, 73, 77 (citations omitted).
(2000) 170 ALR 487 (‘Philip Morris’).
Transcript of Proceedings, Nixon v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd (Federal Court of Australia,
Spender J, 10 November 1999) 258. These concerns are not restricted to the judiciary, but are
shared by some members of the legal profession. This is evident in the following comments
reported in Kate Marshall, ‘Lawyers Win in GIO Class-Action’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 15 August 2003, 51, made at the time of the GIO class action:
defence lawyers warned that corporate Australia could expect an explosion of class actions as
‘entrepreneurial’ plaintiff lawyers seize the opportunity to make money out of disgruntled
shareholders by getting around fee restrictions.
A litigation partner at Clayton Utz, Stuart Clark, said he had been warning anyone who would
listen about the danger of ‘Wild West bounty hunters’ turned class-action litigators.
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long before modern class action regimes existed. However, certain features of
the modern class action regime are sufficiently different from traditional
litigation practices to make some lawyers and judges uncomfortable.27
One of these features is the nature of the relationship between the class lawyer
and the members of the class. In a typical class action, the class is so large that it
is impossible (or, at least, impracticable) for class lawyers and members of the
class to interact in a manner that conforms to the traditional solicitor–client
relationship. In particular, communication patterns will be different, for two
main reasons. First, the size of the class may make it difficult or impossible for
the lawyer to communicate with each individual member — as he or she would
do with an applicant in a two-party dispute. Second, there may be many members of the class who have little if any interest in ongoing communication with
the class lawyers, no expectation of that type of communication, or no inclination to monitor the activities of the class lawyers. This state of affairs is a
foreseeable product of the class action format. One of its purposes is to create a
vehicle for determining claims so small that they could not otherwise be pursued.28 It is in the aggregation of the small claims that the determination is made
possible, but it is because of the small size of most claims that many class
members will take a laissez faire approach.
It is theoretically true that aggregation is not a prerequisite to commencing a
class action. It is possible to identify one plaintiff, proceed with that person as
the lead plaintiff, attempt to resolve the common issues, and only then identify
class members after those common issues have been resolved. In practice,
however, this is not the way class action litigation has evolved. In most cases, the
class lawyer, lead plaintiff or litigation funder will require aggregation. Lead
plaintiffs are hesitant to take the lead without some assurance that there is
substantial interest in the case.29 Identifying a group of other aggrieved parties at
the outset indicates to a lead plaintiff that the case is of sufficient interest to
justify the risks associated with being the representative party. Early aggregation
may also satisfy such a party that he or she will not have to bear the costs burden
alone. For similar reasons, litigation funders commonly insist on some assurance
at the outset that the level of interest and number of claims will be sufficient to
justify the financial risk of funding the case. 30 Class lawyers have similar
concerns.31
27 On the one hand, the High Court has stated that ‘no win, no charge’ or conditional fee arrange-

28
29
30
31

ments for impecunious litigants are consistent with the highest standards of the profession: see
especially Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 203 (Dixon CJ,
McTiernan, Fullagar, Menzies and Windeyer JJ). On the other, entrepreneurial lawyers who
bring class actions for large groups of plaintiffs, many of whom would not otherwise have the
resources to pursue their claims, have been the subject of criticism: see, eg, above nn 24–6 and
accompanying text.
See above Part II(B).
See below Part IV(C), (I), where we discuss the nature of the risks assumed by lead plaintiffs
and the challenge of identifying a class member who is willing to assume those risks.
See below Part V, where we consider the role of litigation funders in class actions, and the type
of risk analysis they conduct before deciding to fund a class action.
Federal Court Act s 33ZJ has not had the effect of reducing the need for aggregation. That
provision makes it possible for lead plaintiffs to deduct from a damages award the difference
between the ‘party and party’ costs that the defendant must pay and the solicitor–client costs that
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Early aggregation is also consistent with the aims of the class action legislation
because it has the capacity to promote efficiency and access to justice.32 It also
ensures that the people affected by a claim receive early notice of that claim.
This is reinforced by the fact that there are notice provisions in the legislation,
the purpose of which is to inform class members of the claim and of their rights
and responsibilities as class members.33
A related source of discomfort is the role of class lawyers in advertising or
soliciting for people to join the class. The practice of soliciting for business by
lawyers has been a controversial issue for those charged with regulating the legal
profession. 34 However, solicitation is now expressly authorised by rules of
professional conduct in Australia,35 and in any event it is inherent in the nature of
a class action and the goals of the legislation that some solicitation will be
required. Under Part IVA of the Federal Court Act, for example, group members
must receive notice of the commencement of a class action.36 This can amount to
solicitation, as John C Coffee Jr suggests:
Solicitation is common in entrepreneurial litigation, where the socially desirable role of the lawyer is to aggregate claims that are by themselves unmarketable. Often, clients are simply unaware that they possess actionable claims.
Thus, attorneys must pursue clients, since the clients will not ordinarily come
to the attorneys. The traditional prohibition on client solicitation embodied the
twin fears that clients retained through unsolicited legal advice would be overcharged and underrepresented. These dangers are not imaginary, but the relevant question about them is: dangerous compared to what? Clients who never
learn of their legal rights receive even less representation and are economically
worse off.37

It may be the degree of solicitation, rather than solicitation per se, that is the
subject of concern. Some solicitation — indeed, a considerable amount compared to traditional litigation — will be required to aggregate claims. Achieving

32
33

34

35
36
37

the lead plaintiff must pay to his or her lawyer. The provision is triggered, however, only where
there has been an ‘award of damages’ — not where a case has settled. Comments made by Sackville J in Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (2002) 122 FCR 168, 188 (‘Courtney’) suggest that it is
theoretically possible to construct a class action settlement in such a way that it is or includes an
‘award of damages’, but we are unaware of any case in which this has occurred. Lead plaintiffs,
class lawyers and litigation funders would not be willing to forego aggregation and the security
it provides on the basis that they might eventually succeed in having s 33ZJ construed in their
favour in the event of a settlement. However, Federal Court Act s 33ZF does confer broad powers upon judges to make any order that they think is ‘appropriate or necessary to ensure that
justice is done in the proceeding’. This might conceivably be used to achieve in a settled case
what is contemplated by Federal Court Act s 33ZJ for a case involving an ‘award of damages’.
These two aims featured prominently in the Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court report:
see Law Reform Commission, above n 2. See also above Part II(B).
It may be that the need for early aggregation has become more pronounced as class actions have
become more complex and expensive, and as institutional litigation funders have increasingly
been relied upon to fund class action litigation. We are unaware of any empirical research that
has considered this question.
See, eg, APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 219 ALR 403. See also John B
Attanasio, ‘Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States’ (1984) 32 American Journal
of Comparative Law 493.
See Christine Parker, ‘Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and
Responsiveness’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 676, 694–5.
Federal Court Act s 33X(1)(a).
Coffee, above n 19, 900 (citations omitted).
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this aggregation is central to the class action legislative scheme.38 Professional
regulation, legal ethics, and judicial oversight of the conduct of class actions are
among the ways in which solicitation and other aspects of the conduct of
litigation can be controlled. However, to equate class action solicitation with
ambulance chasing demonstrates a failure to understand the purpose and
mechanics of the class action regime, and the necessary attributes of class action
lawyers operating effectively within that regime.
B Fear of ‘United States-Style’ Flood of Litigation
Another recurrent concern is that class actions may encourage in Australia
civil litigation practices similar to those thought to exist in the United States.
This is a frequent theme in discussions about common law litigation and civil
justice reform and is not restricted to a consideration of class actions. 39 It is
usually expressed as a belief that there is ‘litigation mania’ or an explosion in the
United States, where cases with no merit are allegedly brought and pursued
solely to hinder respondents and to bring about a nuisance value settlement.40
For example, consider the following exchange about commercial class action
funding arrangements, which occurred in oral argument on the application for
special leave to appeal to the High Court in Fostif Pty Ltd v Campbells Cash &
Carry Pty Ltd, where McHugh J enquired:
In any of the cases has it ever been put forward for the continued justification
of this public policy that this sort of litigation increases pressure on the courts
and adds to the cost of the administration of justice? 41

To this counsel responded:
Well, your Honour, I do not know of any, as it were, research which has identified the extent to which there is such a burden. If Fostif becomes the law, I
think your Honours can take it as almost a moral certainty that a whole new
industry is going to take place. One has heard anecdotal stories of the
United States of people wandering around businesses sort of setting up class
actions like they are going out of style.42

Arguments that there has been an explosion of litigation in the United States
have been criticised on various bases. Some commentators have observed that
38 Use of the ‘ambulance chaser’ and ‘bounty hunter’ labels also fails to account for cases that
39

40

41
42

come to class action lawyers through referrals from other lawyers or approaches by prospective
members of a class. See Hensler, ‘Revisiting the Monster’, above n 17, 196–7.
See ibid 180 (emphasis in original), where Hensler comments: ‘Many ordinary Americans seem
to think that class actions are a new-fangled litigation device invented by greedy plaintiff attorneys. (Outside the United States, the characterization is “greedy American plaintiff attorneys.”)’.
In debates preceding enactment of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Bill 1991 (Cth),
which instituted the Federal Court’s class action regime, Senator Michael Tate stated:
we have set our face firmly against some features of the American legal system such as contingency fees, which appear from my observations over there recently to drive the American
legal system, rather than the merits of the issues themselves.
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 13 November 1991, 3025 (Senator Michael
Tate, Minister for Justice and Consumer Affairs) (emphasis added).
[2005] HCATrans 777, 15 (McHugh J, 30 September 2005).
[2005] HCATrans 777, 15 (N C Hutley, 30 September 2005) (emphasis added).
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these arguments are unsupported by empirical evidence and are instead the
product of untested elite perceptions. 43 Others have treated them as isolated
anecdotes and war stories, influenced by unarticulated values and preconceptions.44 The question of whether there is any empirical proof for claims about a
United States-style litigation explosion has been hotly debated, and is one
beyond the scope of this article. However, regardless of the view one takes of
this debate, there are features of class action practices in Australia that make it
unlikely that any such litigation mania would occur here.
First, class actions are very expensive to run. No applicant, applicant lawyer or
litigation funder would spend the millions of dollars necessary to conduct a large
class action unless there is reasonable certainty of recovery.45 There is little if
any incentive to pursue an unmeritorious claim. Second, the rule that ‘costs
follow the event’ is a substantial disincentive; it operates so that unsuccessful
litigants pay the majority of the successful parties’ legal costs. This rule does not
apply in the United States, where an unsuccessful class action applicant is not
usually obliged to pay the respondents’ costs. One of the reasons given in the
Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court report to refute concerns about
‘blackmail litigation’ was the deterrent effect of the risk of an adverse costs
order.46 The class action legislation preserves that disincentive by requiring the
named applicant to pay the respondent’s costs in the event of loss.47
A realistic appraisal of the evolution of class actions since 1990 strongly
suggests that there has been no flood of litigation in Australia and that business
interests have not been impeded by such litigation.48 The ALRC estimates that
43 See Marc Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and

44

45

46
47

48

Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society’ (1983) 31 UCLA Law
Review 4, 61–2. See also Stephen Burbank, ‘The Roles of Litigation’ (2002) 80 Washington
University Law Quarterly 705, 705–6.
Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of Disputes’, above n 43, 71, where he asks: ‘Could one
imagine public health specialists or poultry breeders conjuring up epidemics and cures with such
cavalier disregard of the incompleteness of the data and the untested nature of the theory?’
See below Part V, in which we expand on the risk analysis inherent in litigation funding. See
also Burbank, above n 43, 709 (citations omitted), where the author makes a similar argument in
the context of litigation in the United States, referring to the empirical research conducted by
Professor Herbert Kritzer into contingency fees as having debunked a resilient myth that
the contingency fee is to blame for much of the supposedly frivolous litigation with which our
courts are supposedly burdened. Of course, this myth is all the more surprising in the age of
Law and Economics, since one would assume that, as rational actors, contingency fee lawyers
pick and choose their cases, mindful that the dollars spent on losers are their own. Professor
Kritzer’s work has provided evidence that this assumption is correct and thus that those who
regard frivolous litigation as a serious problem should look elsewhere for a whipping boy.
Law Reform Commission, above n 2, 34, 144–5.
The Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court report states that ‘the costs rules in grouped
proceedings would act as a stronger disincentive to the commencement of blackmail suits than is
the case for individual actions’: ibid 145. These costs rules have been described in academic
literature as a considerable barrier to bringing a class action: see Rachel Mulheron, The Class
Action in Common Law Legal Systems (2004) 438; Vince Morabito, ‘Federal Class Actions,
Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing Litigation Costs’ (1995) 21 Monash University Law
Review 231, 232.
In addition to judicial concerns about legal entrepreneurialism, discussed above in Part III(A),
concerns have also been voiced by some members of the legal profession about the negative
impact that class actions are likely to have on doing business. For example, in 2004 The Australian Financial Review published an article by two senior Australian company lawyers which
concluded that ‘[i]f the business community fails to lobby for legislative change at the federal,
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by the year 2000 there were 20 class actions before the Federal Court. 49 In
December 2005, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court estimated that there had
been 166 class actions in that Court concluded by that date, with 158 finalised
and eight still on foot. 50 In addition, the ALRC has confirmed that concerns
about a flood of litigation have not materialised:
Representative proceedings legislation was received with trepidation by some
potential respondents, concerned at ‘legal entrepreneurialism’, ‘US style litigation’ and ‘sensational’ claims. Some lawyers and companies continue to express these concerns, although in consultations with the Commission, some
lawyers agreed that there is no present evidence of unmeritorious claims or any
litigation explosion as a result of the representative proceedings.
Contrary to the concerns surrounding the introduction of the procedure in the
Federal Court, none of the dire consequences predicted have actually materialised in the past five years. There has been no flood of class action litigation.
Instead there has been a gradual adoption of the procedure in many appropriate
cases with more than adequate restraint and control being exercised by the
Court as Judges and the profession seek to come to grips with a procedure
which undoubtedly has the potential to contribute significantly to the administration of justice.51

Those class actions that have been commenced do not appear to have been
unduly burdensome for the courts, with the ALRC reporting that, ‘procedures for
representative proceedings generally appear to be working well and in accordance with legislative intentions. The Federal Court does not view such cases as
more problematic than other complex cases.’52
For all these reasons, it is unlikely that there will be any sudden increase in the
number of class actions. The ‘costs follow the event’ rule and the expense of
running a class action will continue to operate as disincentives.53 Indeed, there

49
50

51

52
53

state and territory levels, class actions will become much more of an impediment to doing business in Australia’: Stuart Clark and Greg Williams, ‘Class Actions a Growing Threat’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 11 March 2004, 79. It is not clear from the article what type
of legislative change should be the objective of the business community’s lobbying; whether it is
that the rights of persons to bring an action against members of the business community when
they are aggrieved be removed, or that their ability to instigate or participate in a class action
against members of the business community be taken away. The former is an extraordinary
proposition but in reality the outcomes would be the same. Whether it is the underlying legal
right or the availability of a class action procedure by which to enforce that right that is removed, the result would be to make ordinary people who have claims against members of the
business community less willing and less able to pursue those claims.
ALRC, above n 22, 479.
Chief Justice Michael Black, Federal Court of Australia, ‘Untitled’ (Speech delivered at the
International Class Actions Conference, Melbourne, 2 December 2005). See also Matt Drummond, ‘ASIC Talks Up Class Actions’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 5 December
2005, 5.
ALRC, above n 22, 477–8 (citations omitted). In this passage, the ALRC refers to Neil Francey,
‘Class Action’ (Paper presented at the New South Wales Bar Association Continuing Legal
Education Programme, Sydney, 9 February 1998) [20].
ALRC, above n 22, 479 (citations omitted).
A related question is whether the ‘costs follow the event’ rule ought to be a part of a class action
regime. In a report prepared for the Attorney-General’s Law Reform Advisory Council, a recommendation was made against including the rule in the Victorian class action legislation: see
Vince Morabito and Judd Epstein, Attorney-General’s Law Reform Advisory Council, Class
Actions in Victoria — Time for a New Approach, Project No 16 (1995) [7.22]–[7.28].
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may be a risk that, if the following issues are not addressed, use of the class
action regime will decline below an optimal level. We are not suggesting that the
class action door should open to anyone who wishes to gain entry. In ordinary
civil litigation there are various ways to keep unmeritorious claims out of the
system — or to dispose of them summarily — and there is no reason why class
action litigation should be any different. We argue however that since the
enactment of the Federal Court Act some developments have limited the
availability of the class action regime in a manner that is contrary to the legislation’s fundamental aims. In the following Part we explain why they impede the
healthy development of class action litigation and recommend ways in which
some of these developments might be reversed — or at least their worst effects
mitigated.
IV S P E C I FIC D I F FIC U LT I E S F O R C L A I M A N T S I N C L A S S A C T I O N S
A Tactics of Delay and Attrition
It has long been accepted by judges and regulators that the class action mechanism aims to increase the efficiency of litigation, reduce expense and minimise
complexity. 54 The challenges of funding and conducting class actions are
compounded when these aims are ignored. However, an examination of the
Australian case law reveals that respondents often try to resist claims by invoking technical arguments about the requirements and appropriateness of the class
action mechanism. 55 These arguments take many forms, including attacks on
pleadings,56 arguments that the number of common issues is not sufficient to
justify the matter proceeding as a class action, 57 and arguments that not all
members of the class have a cause of action against all respondents.58
Such attempts are antithetical to the aims of class action legislation, reducing
efficiency, increasing expense and adding considerable complexity to proceedings. This state of affairs was criticised by Finkelstein J on appeal in
Bright v Femcare:
There is a disturbing trend that is emerging in representative proceedings which
is best brought to an end. I refer to the numerous interlocutory applications, including interlocutory appeals, that occur in such proceedings. This case is a
particularly good example. The respondents have not yet delivered their defences yet there have been approximately seven or eight contested interlocutory
54 See, eg, Sreika v Cardinal Financial Services Ltd [2000] FCA 1647 (Unreported, Tamberlin J,

55

56
57
58

23 November 2000) [9]; Batten v Container Terminal Management Services Ltd [2000] FCA
1493 (Unreported, Kiefel J, 22 October 2001) [12]; Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR
255.
See, eg, Bright v Femcare Ltd (2001) 188 ALR 633; Bright v Femcare Ltd (2002) 195 ALR 574
(‘Bright v Femcare’); King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2000] FCA 1543 (Unreported, Wilcox, Lehane and Merkel JJ, 1 November 2000); Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394.
See, eg, Petrusevski v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd [2003] FCA 61 (Unreported, Sackville J,
14 February 2003); Philip Morris (2000) 170 ALR 487; Bright v Femcare (2002) 195 ALR 574.
See, eg, Bright v Femcare (2002) 195 ALR 574, 577–83 (Lindgren J); Guglielmin v Trescowthick [No 2] (2005) 220 ALR 515, 527–31 (Mansfield J).
See, eg, Philip Morris (2000) 170 ALR 487, 517–20 (Sackville J); Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche
Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 317, 344–6 (Carr J) (‘Bray v Hoffman Appeal’).
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hearings before a single judge, one application to a Full Court and one appeal
to the High Court. I would not be surprised if the applicants’ legal costs are by
now well in excess of $500 000. I say nothing about the respondents’ costs.
This is an intolerable situation, and one which the court is under a duty to prevent, if at all possible. … [I]t is not unknown for respondents in class actions to
do whatever is necessary to avoid a trial, usually by causing the applicants to
incur prohibitive costs. The court should be astute to ensure that such tactics
are not successful.59

In Bright v Femcare the applicant’s wasted costs and disbursements exceeded
$1 million. The action was eventually discontinued because the class action
mechanism was not providing effective relief. This may be pointed to as evidence that the action should not have been instituted in the first place, and to
justify the manner in which the respondent conducted the litigation. However, it
might well be asked: did the claim fail to provide effective relief because it was
an inappropriate matter to have ever been brought as a class action, or because of
the intensity with which the defendants resisted it? Consider that there were two
appeals to the Full Court of the Federal Court and two appeals to the High Court
— even before the applicant had received a defence. The applicant won both
Federal Court appeals.60 The High Court had not heard the appeals to it at the
time the case was discontinued as a class action. It is at least possible that the
resulting expense contributed to the applicant’s decision to terminate the class
action.
The applicant’s success in the Federal Court appeals suggests that the decision
to bring the claim as a class action was appropriate. A consideration of the facts
of Bright v Femcare offers further support for this view.61 One of the functions
of the class action regime is to provide a mechanism for resolving common
questions. Among the common questions that could have been resolved in
Bright v Femcare were whether the device was defective, whether the brochures
distributed by the respondents provided sufficient information, and whether the
device came out of calibration with repeated use. One outcome of the decision to
terminate the claim as a class action was that many of the claims proceeded —
and were ultimately settled — as individual medical negligence claims against
doctors and hospitals in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria. Any
suggestion that this would have been less expensive than the class action
mechanism to resolve the common questions is, as Finkelstein J remarked,
‘inherently unlikely to be true.’62
Analysed on its merits, then, there is at least some evidence that this was an
appropriate case to proceed as a class action. Perhaps this is what prompted
Finkelstein J to describe as ‘disturbing’ the trend towards excessive numbers of
59 (2002) 195 ALR 574, 581–2.
60 See ibid; Femcare Ltd v Bright (2000) 100 FCR 331.
61 The claim was brought by women who had undergone the Filshie clip sterilisation procedure

against the inventor of the device and its Australian distributor. There were two groups of claimants: the women in one group had become pregnant after undergoing the sterilisation procedure,
while the women in the second group had to undergo a second medical procedure as a result of
the defective device.
62 Bright v Femcare (2002) 195 ALR 574, 606. This issue is also considered below in the context
of applications under Federal Court Act s 33N: see below n 78 and accompanying text.
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interlocutory proceedings in class actions, and to attribute this trend, in part, to
respondents’ tactics of doing ‘whatever is necessary to avoid a trial, usually by
causing the applicants to incur prohibitive costs.’63
In most of the cases in which defendants have challenged use of the class
action mechanism, they have been unable to argue successfully that the case
would be run more efficiently as individual claims.64 In our opinion, the aim is
usually to ensure that the class action proceeding stops, making it likely that the
individual claims will not run at all. If this is not the specific aim, then it is the
result — for, as many judges and commentators have observed, the only way that
most of these claims can be pursued at all is through the vehicle of the class
action. Mansfield J recognised this reality in Guglielmin v Trescowthick [No 2]:
I am also mindful that an order under s 33N at this stage would effectively put
out of court the group members. They are large in number. Their claims are
relatively small … It would simply be uneconomic for their individual claims
to be pursued. It would also not be in the public interest including for the efficient and effective use of the court’s resources to hear and determine one claim
of one holder of the Holdings securities at 3 April 2001, without the other holders of Holdings securities at that time (and the respondents) also being bound
by the determination of issues common to those other potential claims.65

These issues may be better understood by considering them within the factual
context of King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd. 66 Mr King, the representative
applicant, had a claim for about $3000 damages. He could not have sued GIO, its
directors and advisers for that sum because of the cost to bring and to defend
such a claim. It was only through the mechanism of the class action that he was
able to assert his own small claim. The legal costs of opposing the class action
claim totalled approximately $30 million. Because of the availability of the class
action regime, 22 000 shareholders received compensation of $97 million for
corporate behaviour that had been roundly condemned.67 After the class action
had commenced, GIO’s conduct also became the subject of an ASIC prosecution
that was ultimately successful.68 It is highly unlikely that any shareholder would
have received compensation without the class action.
Class actions are commonly claims for significant monetary damages because
they are commenced to address mass wrongs. It is understandable and appropriate that such large claims are strenuously defended by the respondents to the
actions. However, the cost dynamics of class actions mean that even if the
chances of success in a strikeout application are low, it is usually financially
worthwhile for a respondent to make one. By this and related methods, some
respondents have adopted a strategy whereby repeated applications are made to

63
64
65
66
67

Bright v Femcare (2002) 195 ALR 574, 607–8.
Cf ibid 606, where Finkelstein J noted that these arguments are unpersuasive.
(2005) 220 ALR 515, 533.
[2000] FCA 1543 (Unreported, Wilcox, Lehane and Merkel JJ, 1 November 2000).
See Anthony Hughes, ‘Shareholder Lawsuits Are Here To Stay, Companies Warned’, The Sydney
Morning Herald (Sydney), 9 August 2003, 45.
68 See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2005) 55 ACSR 617.

— Class Action Litigation — version 1.5 — page 415 of 42 —

2006]

Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class Action Litigation

415

strike out proceedings — combined with other applications on various technical
points — and multiple appeals are pursued, almost regardless of merit or cost.
It would be naïve to think that court processes are not misused by both plaintiffs and defendants. This problem is a recurring theme in discussions about civil
justice reform. For example, Lord Woolf made the following observations in
Access to Justice: Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice
System in England and Wales:
In the absence of any effective control by the court itself, however, the timetable is frequently ignored, and the lack of firm supervision enables the parties to
exploit the rules to their own advantage. Such exploitation is endemic in the
system: the complexity of civil procedure itself enables the financially stronger
or more experienced party to spin out proceedings and escalate costs, by litigating on technical procedural points or peripheral issues instead of focusing on
the real substance of the case. All too often, such tactics are used to intimidate
the weaker party and produce a resolution of the case which is either unfair or
is achieved at a grossly disproportionate cost or after unreasonable delay.69

Similar comments have been made about civil litigation in Australia.70 Numerous interlocutory applications, and their consequent appeals, have become a
feature of class actions in Australia. They have adversely affected the efficacy of
such litigation as a remedy. They increase the costs of bringing an action, which
inevitably reduce the willingness of applicants to bring them. The assertive case
management philosophies expressed by Finkelstein J in Bright v Femcare and by
Mansfield J in Guglielmin v Trescowthick [No 2] are the most effective way of
counteracting this negative trend.

69 Lord Woolf, Department for Constitutional Affairs, United Kingdom, Access to Justice: Interim

Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (1995) [5.5],
which is available at <http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/woolf.htm>. Lord Woolf also stated,
at [5.6], that there was considerable evidence that individual plaintiffs in personal injury cases
‘are often forced to settle for inadequate compensation because of the delaying tactics employed
by defendants’ insurance companies’ and that discovery is sometimes used in larger, commercial
cases ‘as a tactical weapon to intimidate a financially weaker opponent or to test the opponent’s
seriousness in pursuing the action.’
70 Justice G L Davies has expressed concern that inequality of resources in litigation ‘may compel
a poorer opponent to expend more money than he or she can afford by engaging in time and cost
wasting procedures thereby compelling the poorer litigant either to compromise unfairly or to
give up’: Justice G L Davies, ‘The Reality of Civil Justice Reform: Why We Must Abandon the
Essential Elements of Our System’ (2003) 12 Journal of Judicial Administration 155, 158.
Davies J also opines that ‘a consequence of the [reforms] aimed at reducing party control over
the litigation process has also been to reduce the extent to which one party can manipulate the
system to his or her advantage and to the disadvantage of the other’: at 161.

— Class Action Litigation — version 1.5 — page 416 of 42 —

416

Melbourne University Law Review

[Vol 30

B Section 33N and ‘Declassing’ a Proceeding
Federal Court Act s 33N(1) provides that the Federal Court may, on its own
motion or upon application by the respondent, order that a proceeding no longer
continue as a class action if:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a
representative proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member conducted a separate proceeding; or
all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a
representative proceeding under this Part; or
the representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective
means of dealing with the claims of group members; or
it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative proceeding.

This section has proved to be fertile ground for challenges to class action
proceedings. Many statements of the law of class actions in Australia have
occurred while considering s 33N. For example, the comments of Finkelstein J
in Bright v Femcare were made in the context of a s 33N application by the
respondents. His Honour criticised the strategy adopted by respondents of
repeated applications, and then appeals, on issues related to pleadings, particulars and other procedural matters.71
As early as 1995, the adoption of s 33N in the Victorian legislation was
strongly criticised. Chief among the criticisms presented in a report prepared for
the Attorney-General’s Law Reform Advisory Council was the extent to which
s 33N had ‘generated unnecessary litigation as most defendants, opposing class
suits, have invariably relied on one or more [of the s 33N provisions] to argue
that the court should stop the claims being pursued by means of a representative
proceeding.’72 We endorse the view set forward in the report that the Federal
Court’s power to terminate a proceeding, once it has satisfied the threshold
requirements to proceed as a class action, ought to be very limited.73
In most class actions there are both common and individual questions in contention between the parties. Respondents often argue that some balance should
be made between the individual and common issues and that, if the individual
issues predominate, the case should be struck out as a class action. It is not
difficult for such a respondent to generate numerous examples of individual
questions which might be said to outweigh the common questions.74 Notwith-

71 Bright v Femcare (2002) 195 ALR 574, 605–8. The comments of Mansfield J in Gug-

lielmin v Trescowthick [No 2] (2005) 220 ALR 515, 533 were also made in the context of a
s 33N application.

72 Morabito and Epstein, above n 53, [6.16].
73 See ibid [6.19].
74 See Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-692, where the

argument was made even though all claims arose out of one explosion and fire.

— Class Action Litigation — version 1.5 — page 417 of 42 —

2006]

Access to Justice and the Evolution of Class Action Litigation

417

standing the High Court’s rejection of this approach in Wong v Silkfield,75 similar
arguments are still occasionally advanced.76
These arguments are misconceived. If there are any substantial common issues
of law or fact, it is inherently more efficient to resolve them in one action for all
group members than to have many trials on the same point. Any common
question of fact or law which has some weight or significance need only be
determined once in a class action, and thereby bind all class members and the
respondent. Even if the proceedings are then ‘declassed’, the class action would
still have saved significant amounts of time, costs and resources for the parties
and the court.77 If there is a strong case on the common questions and a judgment favourable to the applicant is obtained, the result is often settlement on a
global basis. This avoids further litigation on individual issues and results in
further savings for the parties and courts.
As we argued in the preceding section, s 33N applications are often made not
out of a concern that the proceedings will be more efficiently and effectively
conducted for the group members as individual proceedings, but rather in the
expectation that the individual cases will not be conducted at all if the proceeding is ‘declassed’. In response to the respondent’s arguments in Bright v Femcare
that the case could be more efficiently run as individual proceedings — an
argument accepted at first instance but rejected on appeal — Finkelstein J stated:
The only foundation for the finding that the costs of many individual actions
are likely to be less than the cost of one representative proceeding is an unsubstantiated assertion by the solicitor acting for the first respondent. I say that the
allegation is unsubstantiated because the solicitor provided no explanation how
it might be that one action is likely to be less costly than many separate actions.
For my own part, in the absence of a compelling explanation I would place no
weight on such a statement because it is inherently unlikely to be true. Moreover, … the total number of group members is not yet known. That circumstance alone is sufficient to render irrelevant the solicitor’s evidence: How
could he say that one representative action would be more costly than many actions when he is unable to specify the number of actions with which the comparison is being made? In any event I simply do not accept that one action can
cost more than what may amount to hundreds of actions.78

The majority in Bright v Femcare confirmed that a key consideration under
s 33N is whether it would be cheaper to run the matter as a class action or as
individual actions. Their Honours also confirmed that whether it is ‘in the
interests of justice’ that a matter no longer continue as a class action must be
balanced against the legislative aims of efficiency and access to justice.79
75 (1999) 199 CLR 255.
76 See, eg, Bright v Femcare (2002) 195 ALR 574, 577–83 (Lindgren J); and, more recently,

Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394; Rod Investments (Vic) Pty Ltd v Clark [2005] VSC 449 (Unreported, Hansen J, 18 November 2005) (‘Media World’).

77 See, eg, Zhang v Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 45 FCR

384, 403–5 (French J).

78 (2002) 195 ALR 574, 606.
79 Ibid 605–6 (Finkelstein J).
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It may be that the combined effect of Wong v Silkfield 80 and the restrictive
manner in which the courts have interpreted Federal Court Act s 33N are
sufficient to counteract the significant impact that the provision can have on the
legislation’s underlying aims. It is likely that the number of respondent applicants under s 33N have declined over time, as case law and judicial attitudes
have defined its boundaries — though no apparent empirical evidence supports
this view. However, as stated above, respondents still advance such arguments.
The provision is too wide, especially s 33N(1)(c) and (d), and we suggest that
discussion about legislative reform should strongly consider their removal.
C Constitution of the Class
Federal Court Act s 33C states that an applicant may begin a representative
proceeding for some or all of the persons satisfying the s 33C criteria: that is, the
persons having claims that arise out of the same, similar or related circumstances
giving rise to a substantial common question of law or fact. This provision has
frequently been used to enable persons to group together in a class action and to
agree upon a way of bringing their claims forward, whether that be agreement as
to the solicitor they will all retain, agreement as to contributions to a ‘fighting
fund’, or agreement to obtain litigation funding.
Many class actions have been commenced and completed in which the claim is
brought by an applicant on behalf of identified group members. In such cases,
class members are usually set out in a schedule or list, even though it encompasses only some of the persons affected by the alleged wrong that is the subject
of the action. Such lists have been the result of agreements between group
members about the best way forward in particular cases, and have meant that not
all victims of an alleged wrong fell within the class definition.81
In two recent decisions however, the ability of claimants to take this course has
been significantly restricted. 82 In Aristocrat, 83 the group definition in the
statement of claim was limited to the applicant and other persons ‘for whom the
solicitors for the Applicant have instructions to act at any particular time’ who
had acquired certain shares during a nominated period (‘the solicitor criterion’).
Stone J noted that the solicitors only accepted instructions from persons who
entered into a retainer agreement with them, and that it was a term of each
retainer agreement that the person also enter into a funding agreement with a
nominated commercial litigation funder. Her Honour held that the solicitor
80 (1999) 199 CLR 255.
81 See, eg, Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 43 FCR

100; Nguyen v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 66 FCR
239; Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2001) 111 IR 241;
Woodlands v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 139; Cameron v Qantas Airways Ltd
(1995) 55 FCR 147; Magnus v South Pacific Air Motive Pty Ltd (1997) 78 FCR 456; Magnus v South Pacific Air Motive Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 465 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 27 April 2001);
McIntyre v Eastern Prosperity Investments Pty Ltd [No 3] [2002] FCA 406 (Unreported, French
J, 8 April 2002); Spangaro v Corporate Investment Australian Funds Management Ltd (2003) 54
ATR 241; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [No 2] (1996) 66 FCR 128.
82 See Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394; Media World [2005] VSC 449 (Unreported, Hansen J, 18
November 2005).
83 (2005) 147 FCR 394.
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criterion imposed an impermissible ‘opt in’ requirement contrary to the ‘opt out’
regime in Part IVA.84
In Media World,85 Hansen J of the Supreme Court of Victoria followed and
extended the operation of Aristocrat. Media World concerned an application by a
group of experienced investors, who alleged that loss had been caused by the
respondent’s misleading conduct. These investors had considered their options
for recovery, taken advice from several solicitors, selected one firm and finally
elected to commence a class action on behalf of only those in their group. The
class definition in the initial statement of claim was similar to that in Aristocrat,
but was later amended so that the group members were identified by a schedule
of the names of those who initially instructed the solicitors. The applicant
contended that a group of claimants was entitled to bring an action for its own
benefit and to specify itself in a list, without having to sue for all potential group
members, and that this practice was not restricted by Part 4A of the Victorian
Act. The applicant argued that there was no continuing obligation to retain
particular solicitors because, once on the schedule, a person who ceased to retain
the solicitors could still remain a group member. This was said to distinguish the
situation from that in Aristocrat.
Hansen J rejected this distinction because the list had been compiled using the
solicitor criterion, which his Honour held amounted to an impermissible opt in
process for the same reasons given by Stone J in Aristocrat.86 At the time of
writing, the appropriate consequential orders to be made in Aristocrat and Media
World are yet to be determined. For that reason, we will not analyse the decisions
in detail and will only comment generally on their potential effect.
In our experience, victims of a mass wrong who are interested in pursuing a
case often take the view that the litigation should be for the benefit of those who
agree upon common arrangements for its efficient conduct. These arrangements
might include, for example, contributing to a fighting fund, agreeing to particular
funding arrangements, or agreeing to use and follow reasonable advice of shared
solicitors. However, unless people can band together, class actions can only
commence if a representative party comes forward. Such a party agrees to meet
the cost of bringing the case for the benefit of all, and bears all the risk of an
adverse costs order — yet obtains no benefit that could not be obtained in an
individual action. This is a significant disincentive to use of the regime.
The decisions in Aristocrat and Media World may therefore reduce the efficacy
of the class action mechanism. As a result, other mechanisms for aggregating
claims, either in old-style representative proceedings or multiple applicant
actions, will attract renewed attention. This would be an unfortunate outcome,
because it was the difficulty associated with those other mechanisms for aggregating claims that led to the introduction of class actions in the first place. At the
time of writing, there are at least two large claims in excess of $97 million that

84 Ibid 426–31 (Stone J).
85 [2005] VSC 449 (Unreported, Hansen J, 18 November 2005).
86 Ibid [39]–[41]. See also Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394, 431 (Stone J).
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will not run as class actions as a direct result of the Aristocrat and Media World
decisions.87
D Security for Costs
Until recently, security for costs was not a major concern in class actions.
Courts were disinclined to make orders that might have the effect of forcing
group members to contribute to a pool of funds to conduct the action. Such
orders were considered to be contrary to the spirit of Federal Court Act s 43(1A),
which limits the availability of costs orders to the named parties.88 There was
also concern that such orders might force applicants to bring their claims
separately or abandon them altogether.89
In Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd,90 Merkel J referred to his earlier decision
in Woodhouse v McPhee.91 In that decision, his Honour expressed concern that
costs orders made by reference to the resources of a class would undermine the
intent of the legislation:
it would be incongruous and anomalous for Parliament specially to confer a direct costs immunity under s 43(1A), inter alia to afford represented persons
greater access to justice, and then for the courts indirectly to remove the effect
of that immunity by making orders for security for costs on the basis that the
applicant is bringing the proceedings for the benefit of others who ought to
bear their share of the potential costs liability to other parties. In my view, in
order to deal with that incongruity and anomaly the fact that an impecunious
applicant is bringing a pt IVA proceeding for the benefit of represented persons,
whilst a relevant consideration in favour of granting security, ought not of itself
be as significant a consideration as it might otherwise be in favour of the granting of security.92

However, upon appeal to the Full Court, 93 Finkelstein and Carr JJ took a
contrary view. Finkelstein J found that the characteristics of group members
should be taken into account as a relevant factor in determining whether to make
87 Maurice Blackburn Cashman Lawyers is instructed in three shareholder claims (Challenger

88

89

90
91
92
93

Financial Services Group Ltd, Multiplex Ltd and Australian Wheat Board Ltd) in which proceedings will be issued under state (New South Wales) representative proceedings legislation
rather than under Federal Court Act pt IVA as a direct result of the Aristocrat and Media World
cases.
Federal Court Act s 43(1A) provides:
In a representative proceeding commenced under Part IVA or a proceeding of a representative
character commenced under any other Act that authorises the commencement of a proceeding
of that character, the Court or Judge may not award costs against a person on whose behalf the
proceeding has been commenced (other than a party to the proceeding who is representing
such a person) except as authorised by … in the case of a representative proceeding commenced under Part IVA — section 33Q or 33R.
See, eg, Ryan v Great Lakes Council (1998) 154 ALR 584; Ryan v Great Lakes Council (1998)
155 ALR 447 (‘Great Lakes Appeal’); Woodhouse v McPhee (1997) 80 FCR 529; Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317.
(2002) 118 FCR 1 (‘Bray v Hoffman First Instance’).
(1997) 80 FCR 529.
Ibid 533, referred to in Bray v Hoffman First Instance (2002) 118 FCR 1; and cited in
Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317, 347 (Carr J).
Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317.
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an order for security for costs.94 Carr J found that whether an order should be
made may depend on the financial circumstances of the group members and
whether an order for costs might stifle litigation.95
If applications for security for costs may be determined by reference to the
financial circumstances of group members, there is a real risk that many class
actions will be unable to proceed. Applicants with small claims — and it is
beyond dispute that this is one class of litigant for whom the legislation was
enacted — may be unable or unwilling to pay the large security for costs orders
made on the basis of the financial characteristics of group members over whom
the applicant has no influence or control. This is particularly so where the order
would be for a much larger sum than if the applicant had brought an individual
claim. The class action regime is designed so that people and entities that fit
within a specified class are members of that class unless they take an active step
to opt out. In circumstances where group members may be large and financially
strong, but have no interest in contributing to the costs of the litigation, there is a
risk that the claim of the representative party may be stopped as a result of a
security for costs order. This would undermine s 43(1A) and would also have the
tendency to stifle genuine claims.
It may be suggested that it is unfair for respondents to incur costs with no
prospect of security for those costs, in circumstances where there are some class
members who are not the lead plaintiff but who have the resources to post
security. This argument is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.
Defendants in class actions receive the same protection as that which they
receive in other actions — that is, the court has discretion to make an order for
security against the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the fact that no order can be made
against a class member is often argued to be unfair. Such an argument presumes
that respondents are entitled to greater protection in class actions — in the form
of security for costs orders — than in other actions. It may be that this argument
would be sounder in principle if an impecunious plaintiff was intentionally put
forward as the lead plaintiff to ensure that no order for security could be made.
However, there is no empirical proof that this occurs in practice. To the contrary,
we suggest below that lead plaintiffs in major Australian class actions have
usually been people of means.96
Significant practical problems are also raised by the suggestion that class
members ought to be subject to security for costs orders. For example, consider
the issue of unidentified class members. A decision to grant security for costs
could not be based upon their resources, because there would be no evidence
from which such an assessment could be made. One need only contemplate how
such an order might be framed and enforced to realise that it would be impracticable. For the same reason, it cannot be suggested that class members of means
should identify themselves, come forward and agree to assume the burden of a
security for costs order, barring which the named plaintiffs and other class
94 Ibid 374.
95 Ibid 348–9.
96 See below nn 160–7 and accompanying text.
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members will be unable to proceed with their action. This places a lead plaintiff
at the mercy of class members over whom that lead plaintiff has no control.
It follows that it must be the identified class members, not the unidentified
ones, whose means would be considered by the court when deciding whether to
make a security for costs order. However, the same issues of control exist. Just
because they are identified does not mean they will agree to assume the burden
of a security for costs order. A further problem is that if only the identified class
members risk being subject to such an order, this would create a greater incentive
for class members to remain unidentified until such time as the case has drawn to
a close.
Two examples of class composition serve to illustrate these difficulties. The
first class is that in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd,97 the second
from King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd.98 Both classes included some large
corporations, each of which retained independent solicitors. These corporations
identified themselves to the class lawyers but did not become lead plaintiffs.
They presumably would have been advised that they could remain in the class
without assuming the lead plaintiff burden and without taking any active part or
interest in the litigation. They probably adopted that course because they thought
that it was in their commercial best interests to do so. In such cases, is it practicable to suggest that their membership in the class and their means ought to be
taken into account by a judge when making a security for costs order against an
impecunious lead plaintiff? Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, if
identified class members refuse to step forward and agree either to be the lead
plaintiff or to take responsibility for a security for costs order, then everyone
suffers — including the lead plaintiff, whose assets may be insufficient to meet
such an order.99
The Bray v Hoffman Appeal decision may limit the willingness of individuals
to become lead plaintiffs and lawyers to take on a class action. This would
impose a significant restriction on use of the regime. Legislative change is
required to make clear that only the applicant’s resources are relevant to the
determination of a security for costs application.

97 (2000) 104 FCR 564.
98 [2000] FCA 1543 (Unreported, Wilcox, Lehane and Merkel JJ, 1 November 2000).
99 The effect of the judgments of Finkelstein and Carr JJ in Bray v Hoffman Appeal is that an order

for security can be made in an appropriate case against class members. This decision is contrary
to the intent of the legislation embodied in Federal Court Act s 43(1A) and explained in earlier
cases and the Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court report: Law Reform Commission,
above n 2. It might be more acceptable if limited to cases in which one or more class members
of substantial means intentionally put forward an impecunious lead plaintiff to avoid a security
for costs order. There is a risk, however, that arguments about whether this had occurred would
become one more basis on which to make interlocutory applications and appeals, thus exacerbating the problems that such procedures already cause in class action litigation: see above
Part IV(A). Further, the potential evidence and proof issues raised by such a qualification may
render it unworkable in practice.
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E Costs in Class Actions
The cost of conducting class actions means that a significant proportion of the
damages payable to group members will often be consumed by solicitor–client
costs. This cost is exacerbated by the satellite litigation — technical challenges,
attacks on pleadings and other interlocutory applications — that has become
commonplace in such actions. As the size of the damages ‘pool’ is reduced by
the increasing solicitor–client costs, the action becomes less valuable for the
group. One way of addressing this difficulty is for courts to respond favourably
to requests for indemnity costs against respondents. However, Australian courts
have hitherto proved reluctant to make such orders.100
Other jurisdictions have adopted various strategies to address these problems.
In the United Kingdom, for example, conditional fee agreements may provide for
an ‘uplift’ or ‘success fee’ of up to 100 per cent.101 This is four times greater than
the maximum amount permitted in those Australian jurisdictions that permit any
uplift or success fee at all. The Canadian courts have also recognised the need to
allow class lawyers’ fees to reflect both the work done and the risk of
non-payment. In Parsons v Canadian Red Cross Society, Winkler J restated the
principle in the following terms:
If the [Class Proceedings Act] is to achieve the legislative objective of providing enhanced access to justice then in large part it will be dependant upon the
willingness of counsel to undertake litigation on the understanding that there is
a risk that the expenses incurred in time and disbursements may never be recovered. It is in this context that a court, in approving a fee arrangement or in
the exercise of fixing fees, must determine the fairness and reasonableness of
the counsel fee. Accordingly, the case law that has developed in Ontario holds
that the fairness and reasonableness of the fee awarded in respect of class proceedings is to be determined in light of the risk undertaken by the solicitor in
conducting the litigation and the degree of success or result achieved.102

These United Kingdom and Canadian approaches address specific problems
facing claimants by limiting the extent to which solicitor–client costs reduce
damages awards and by increasing the willingness of lawyers to undertake such
litigation. Reform of the rules regarding success fees would be consistent with
the other common law jurisdictions. Such reform is an essential component of an
integrated response to the problems created by the resource demands, cost and
risk inherent in class action litigation. Recent comments of state law societies, in
the context of discussions about the rise of commercial litigation funding in
Australia, advocate this type of integrated approach.103

100 See Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [No 2] (2000) 102 FCR 307, 463 (Kiefel J).
101 Conditional Fee Arrangements Order 1995 (UK) s 3, made pursuant to the Courts and Legal

Services Act 1990 (UK) c 41, s 58(2).

102 (1999) 49 OR (3d) 281, 287–8 (citations omitted).
103 See below nn 187–8 and accompanying text.
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F Personal Costs Orders
A further difficulty facing applicants in class actions is the prospect of their
lawyers being held responsible for adverse costs. No complaint can legitimately
be made when a lawyer is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs personally
because of irresponsible recklessness, 104 abuse of process or similar conduct.
However, the prospect of a costs order being made against the representative
applicant’s lawyers because the lawyers ‘promoted’ the litigation is an entirely
different matter. Even the threat of seeking such an order can create difficulties
for applicants in class actions.105
One of the arguments used to justify the availability of personal costs orders
against lawyers who act on a conditional fee basis is that those lawyers ‘promote’
the litigation and should therefore be liable to pay adverse costs directly. 106
However, the threat of such an order can act as a significant deterrent, and may
discourage lawyers from entering the market for class action legal services. In
Tobacco Control Coalition Inc v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd,107 for example,
the respondent tobacco companies threatened to apply for costs orders against
the representative applicant’s solicitors. They did so on the basis that the
applicant company had been established solely for the purpose of bringing the
action. As a consequence, the solicitors for the applicant withdrew. 108 As
Lindgren J observed in Cook v Pasminco Ltd [No 2], it is important that solicitors remain free ‘to undertake cases that appear to have little prospect of success’, including class actions.109 It would be a perverse result if conditional fee
arrangements ‘consistent with the highest standards of the profession’ 110
operated to expose the solicitors providing the arrangement to liability for
adverse costs orders.
G Actions against Multiple Respondents
Federal Court Act s 33C, and its analogue in the Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic), requires that at least seven persons have claims against the same person or
persons, and that the claims must arise out of the same, similar or related
circumstances.

104 Cook v Pasminco Ltd [No 2] (2000) 107 FCR 44, 57 (Lindgren J).
105 Information provided by Bernard Murphy, based on enquiries made of Maurice Blackburn

106
107
108
109

110

Cashman Lawyers, indicates that partners and employees of that firm have been told by opposing solicitors on at least eight occasions that they would be subject to personal liability for the
costs of proceedings.
See, eg, Phillips, above n 22, [7.5]. Similar arguments have been advanced in the context of
respondents’ opposition to the financing of class actions by litigation funders: see below Part V.
Tobacco Control Coalition Inc v Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd [2000] FCA 131 (Unreported,
Wilcox J, 9 February 2000) (‘Tobacco Control Coalition’).
Ibid [9].
(2000) 107 FCR 44, 46. In Canada, personal costs orders are available only ‘in the most unusual
and extreme of cases’: Gordon McKee, ‘Class Actions in Canada: A Potentially Momentous
Change to Canadian Litigation’ (1997) 8 Australian Product Liability Reporter 84, 89.
Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 205 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan,
Fullagar, Menzies and Windeyer JJ).
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The first of these requirements has generated significant litigation. Some of
the resulting decisions have had a deleterious effect on the availability of class
actions as a remedy; in our view, they are incorrect and contrary to the intention
of the legislation. These decisions have interpreted s 33C as requiring all class
members to have claims against all respondents. Accordingly, if there is one
applicant suing multiple respondents on behalf of a class then the applicant and
every group member must have a personal claim against each respondent.111 This
position was confirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Philip Morris,
but is contrary to some earlier cases112 and has subsequently been rejected by
other courts.113
There are good reasons to question the correctness of Philip Morris. First, the
aims of the class action legislation call for a broad interpretation ‘that gives full
effect to the benefits foreseen by the drafters.’114 There is nothing in the language of Part IVA to justify an interpretation that compels a multiplicity of
proceedings; indeed, this would be inconsistent with its aims. 115 Second, in
several earlier decisions, the cases were permitted to proceed as class actions
notwithstanding that not all of the class members were claiming against every
respondent.116 Third, other jurisdictions with similar provisions have not adopted
the narrow Philip Morris approach, preferring instead a broad interpretation
more consistent with the legislative aims.117

111 Philip Morris (2000) 170 ALR 487, 514 (Sackville J). However it should be noted that the point

112
113
114

115
116
117

was not argued directly; rather, there was a concession made by counsel for the applicant,
which the Federal Court affirmed. See also Tropical Shine Holdings v Lake Gesture Pty Ltd
(1993) 45 FCR 457, 462 (Wilcox J); Symington v Hoechst Schering Agrevo Pty Ltd (1997) 78
FCR 164, 166–7 (Wilcox J); Ryan v Great Lakes Council (1997) 78 FCR 309, 312 (Wilcox J)
(‘Great Lakes First Instance’); Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (1999) 94 FCR 179, 186–7 (Wilcox, Ryan and Madgwick JJ); King v GIO Australia
Holdings Ltd [2000] FCA 617 (Unreported, Moore J, 12 May 2000) [14]. It is not, however,
necessary for each group member to succeed against each respondent. In King v GIO Australia
Holdings Ltd [2000] FCA 1543 (Unreported, Wilcox, Lehane and Merkel JJ, 1 November 2000)
[7] (Wilcox, Lehane and Merkel JJ), the court found that a claim does not necessarily equate to a
successful judgment and that the Federal Court Act s 33C requirement for a claim was therefore
met even if the claim was ultimately unsuccessful. This case was followed in Guglielmin v
Trescowthick [No 2] (2005) 220 ALR 515, 522 (Mansfield J).
See, eg, McMullin v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd (1997) 72 FCR 1.
See, eg, Bray v F Hoffman La-Roche Ltd (2003) 25 ATPR ¶41-906.
See Hollick v Toronto [2001] 3 SCR 158, cited in Vince Morabito, ‘Class Actions against
Multiple Respondents’ (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 295, 304, where the Supreme Court of
Canada commented on the Ontario provision equivalent to Federal Court Act s 33C.
See Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317, 372–4 (Finkelstein J).
See Morabito, ‘Class Actions against Multiple Respondents’, above n 114, 308–13.
See ibid 315:
As was the case with the practice of the Federal Court in the pre-Philip Morris era, permitting
the use of the class action device in multiple respondent suits, without requiring compliance
with a principle such as the Philip Morris principle, has not generated problems for Canadian
courts — in managing class proceedings — nor has it resulted in unfairness for either class
members or defendants in Ontario and British Columbia. At the same time, this approach has
expanded the availability of the class action device in multiple respondent suits thereby facilitating the attainment of the important social goals of class actions.
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More recent decisions indicate that some judges do not accept the narrow
interpretation. In Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd, Merkel J stated:
While it is clear that s 33C(1)(a) requires that the applicant and each group
member have a claim against the respondent it is not altogether clear that the
same requirement was intended to apply where there were multiple respondents. As I later explain, the present case affords a good example of how the
strict application of s 33C(1)(a), in a case involving more than one respondent,
might give rise to requirements and limitations that have little to do with the
purpose or efficacy of pt IVA. However, as a single judge I am bound to apply
the principles enunciated by the Full Court in Philip Morris.118

When this matter reached the Full Court, the majority (comprising Finkelstein
and Carr JJ) expressly rejected Philip Morris, deciding that each group member
did not need to have a claim against each respondent. Finkelstein J stated:
It seems to me that if Philip Morris be correctly decided, we are heading back
in the direction of 1852. This result, so it seems to me, is so undesirable that it
should be avoided at all costs unless, of course, parliament has mandated it in
clear and unambiguous language. I am of the very firm view that there is nothing in the language of s 33C(1), when considered in isolation or in its setting,
which requires that result. … I will not place a construction on s 33C which requires separate proceedings to be instituted. If it were impermissible to bring
such an action, all the objectives of pt IVA, the reduction of legal costs, the enhancement of access by individuals to legal remedies, the promotion of the efficient use of court resources, ensuring consistency in the determination of
common issues, and making the law more enforceable and effective, would be
undermined.119

In contrast to the majority, Branson J considered herself bound by Philip Morris,
but gave it only qualified support.120
Since these comments were made, there have been conflicting decisions.121
So long as the issue remains unresolved, it will continue to cause practical
difficulties for applicants in class actions involving multiple respondents. The
resulting uncertainty is especially troublesome in complex commercial cases, in
which wrongful conduct is frequently caused by various parties who may be
responsible to varying degrees. The practical consequence of the narrow Philip
Morris approach is that class actions can be used only against respondents whose
wrongdoing is common to all class members. This is the result notwithstanding
the fact that the case of some group members against individual wrongdoers may
be stronger than the case that is common to all class members.
118
119
120
121

(2003) 25 ATPR ¶41-906, 46 505 (emphasis added).
Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317, 373–4.
Ibid 358–9.
In Milfull v Terranora Lakes Country Club Ltd (in liq) (2004) 214 ALR 228, 229 (Kiefel J), his
Honour, relying on Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317, observed that the requirement
that each group member have a claim against each respondent ‘no longer prevails’. However, in
Guglielmin v Trescowthick [No 2] (2005) 220 ALR 515, 522 (citations omitted), Mansfield J
stated:
Most recently Tamberlin J in Johnstone indicated that the observations of Finkelstein J are
obiter dicta, and considered himself bound by Philip Morris. I propose to adopt the same
course. The applicant, through senior counsel, did not ask me to act otherwise.
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The Philip Morris approach also leads to artificial arguments about pleadings.
Applicants are routinely exposed to interlocutory litigation on this issue which is
expensive and can involve significant delay.122 Some cases have been discontinued as a result.123 In our opinion, tobacco litigation has taken a different course
in Australia as a result of this interpretation of Federal Court Act s 33C. In
practical terms, such a narrow approach has meant that claims for injury caused
by smoking cannot be joined.124
The disturbing effect is that greater limitations may operate upon claims made
in class actions than upon those made in individual actions. 125 Legislative
amendments are necessary to incorporate the view of the Bray v Hoffman Appeal
majority. Because of the approach taken in Philip Morris, a prudent applicant’s
lawyer may be required to balance the procedural advantages of a class action for
his or her clients against the desirability of pleading a case against each respondent that is potentially liable. Given the uncertainty of the law on this point,
prudence requires class lawyers to proceed on the basis that a court will, if asked,
adopt the narrow interpretation of s 33C in a case involving multiple respondents.
H Settlement of Class Actions
Settlement difficulties are not unique to class action litigation in Australia.
Settlement has been one of the areas of greatest attention in class action jurisprudence in North America, where the law is more developed. 126 One of the
challenges is to ensure that the interests of class members are adequately
protected.127 A related issue is that the interests of the applicant and respondent
and their lawyers may have converged by the time they agree on a settlement
proposal, which means that any potential conflict of interest between the class
representative and the other class members would not be mitigated by adversarial
arguments. In Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty Ltd, Finkelstein J noted that a
judge’s job in ensuring the fairness of a settlement ‘is indeed an onerous one,

122 See, eg, Symington v Hoechst Schering Agrevo Pty Ltd (1997) 78 FCR 164; Great Lakes First

123
124

125

126
127

Instance (1997) 78 FCR 309; Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (1999) 94 FCR 179; Philip Morris (2000) 170 ALR 487; King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (2000) 174 ALR 715.
See, eg, Philip Morris (2000) 170 ALR 487.
See ibid. For a consideration of a similar trend in tobacco litigation in the United States, see
Robert L Rabin, ‘The Third Wave of Tobacco Litigation’ in Robert L Rabin and Stephen D
Sugarman (eds), Regulating Tobacco (2001) 176, 186, where the author states that one of the
reasons for a new surge in individual tobacco litigation cases in the United States was doubt
about the willingness of courts to approve consolidation of tobacco claims.
Damian Grave and Ken Adams observe that Philip Morris (2000) 170 ALR 487 imposes a more
restrictive requirement than is found in the traditional representative proceedings, which were
thought to be too restrictive and were replaced by the more expansive Federal Court Act pt IVA:
Damian Grave and Ken Adams, Class Actions in Australia (2005) 112.
On the settlement of class actions, see generally Mulheron, above n 47, ch 11. See also Grave
and Adams, above n 125, ch 13.
For consideration of this issue from various perspectives, see Hensler, ‘Revisiting the Monster’,
above n 17, 189; Lipp, above n 17, 387–96; Coffee, above n 19, 825–7; Mulheron, above n 47;
Grave and Adams, above n 125, chs 13–14.
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especially where the application is not opposed.’ 128 This is why it has been
suggested that a hearing to approve a settlement is ‘more akin to ex parte
proceedings than adversarial ones.’129
Accordingly, to ensure that the interests of class members are protected, it is
essential for the court to have a significant role in the approval or rejection of
proposed settlements. 130 This is the approach that courts in Australia have
adopted.131 A class action cannot be settled or discontinued without the approval
of the court.132 The test is whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable or
adequate in the interests of group members. In considering whether a proposed
settlement satisfies this test, the courts will have regard to such factors as: the
complexity and duration of the litigation; the reaction of the class to the settlement; the stage of the proceedings; the risks of establishing liability and damages; and the reasonableness of the settlement, in light of the best recovery and
the risks of litigation.133
Notwithstanding these measures, other problems arise in the context of settlement. Some respondents seek to settle directly with group members rather than
communicating offers through the solicitors for the class. The North American
jurisprudence on this issue is clear: once a class is certified, such communications are prohibited.134 Australian courts have preferred to regulate rather than
prohibit such conduct.135
128 (1999) 21 ATPR ¶41-678, 42 670. There have been numerous criticisms of virtually every aspect

129
130

131

132
133

134

of the class action settlement process. See the exhaustive review of the authorities in Mulheron,
above n 47, 392–3, where the author concludes that while concerns about potential abuse of the
class action settlement process are legitimate, they ‘may tend to be overstated, and in any event,
are hardly restricted to class actions jurisprudence’: at 393. For criticisms of some aspects of the
class action settlement process in an Australian context, see Lipp, above n 17, 387–96.
Susan P Koniak and George M Cohen, ‘Under Cloak of Settlement’ (1996) 82 Virginia Law
Review 1051, 1105.
For a summary of the unusual view of the Scottish Law Commission that judges should play a
very limited role in the monitoring of class action settlements, see Mulheron, above n 47, 393.
The Commission’s opinion seems to be based on an outmoded conception of the role of judges
and a desire to apply to class actions the same rules of procedure that are used in non-class
action litigation. This tendency arguably hinders the healthy development of class action regimes.
See, eg, Reiffel v ACN 075 839 226 Pty Ltd [No 2] [2004] FCA 1128 (Unreported, Gyles J,
1 September 2004). Although the courts have taken an active role in the process of approving
settlements, there is still some uncertainty as to which settlements courts are required to involve
themselves in approving: see Courtney (2002) 122 FCR 168 181–2 (Sackville J); Bray v F
Hoffman-La Roche Ltd [2003] FCA 1505 (Unreported, Merkel J, 19 December 2003) [16]–[24].
Federal Court Act s 33V.
Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd [No 4] (2000) 180 ALR 459, 465 (Goldberg J). For
general comments on the role of the judge in the class action settlement process, see Michael J
Legg, ‘Judge’s Role in Settlement of Representative Proceedings: Lessons from United States
Class Actions’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 58, 65–72. Mulheron observes that ‘one of the
most notable features of the class action regimes in [Australia, Canada and the United States] is
the complete lack of statutory guidance by which the court should exercise its discretion in
approving settlement agreements’: Mulheron, above n 47, 397. The author argues that it is necessary to develop and apply statutory criteria to the facts of a proposed settlement: at 397–8.
It may be suggested that because there is a certification process in the United States but none in
Australia, the United States prohibition on defendant communication with class members for the
purpose of settling has little relevance in the Australian context. However, this may be a distinction of little consequence because, as some commentators have observed, the judicial scrutiny
provided by the United States certification process is available through a variety of other mechanisms in Federal Court Act pt IVA. See, eg, Mulheron, above n 47, 26–7 fn 28, and the sources
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One risk of direct communication between respondents and class members is
that class members may be misled about aspects of the claim or terms of the
proposed settlement. Whilst it is impossible to know in advance whether a
respondent will mislead a class member about the case or a settlement offer in a
direct communication, it is clear that the interests of the two parties differ. There
is therefore a real risk that communication between the respondent and the class
members may not be entirely accurate and balanced.
A related problem is that it is often impossible for class members to be provided with independent legal advice about direct communications received from
a respondent. For example, in the GIO class action, GIO contended that it was
entitled to make individual settlement offers. In that case there were potentially
50 000 class members after the opt out period was closed. If the respondent had
made 50 000 individual offers, then the best that the solicitors for the class could
have done was to write 50 000 letters containing generic advice for those class
members. The solicitors for the class could not have provided individual advice
to those class members which took account of their individual situations.
In every class action, there are individual issues relevant to each individual
class member’s case. In a misleading and deceptive conduct case like the GIO
class action, for example, there were individual questions as to the reliance by
each class member on the misleading conduct and the quantification of damage.
Similarly, in a mass tort class action like the Esso class action, where there were
potentially more than one million class members, there were questions as to the
existence of a duty of care in relation to the type of damage suffered by each
class member and issues regarding quantification of the individual damage of
each class member.136 If settlement offers to class members are made in person,137 it is impossible for the solicitors for the class to be present at each of
those negotiations.
The potential negative consequences of this approach are evident when one
considers how events unfolded in the Tasfast class action. That case involved a
constitutional challenge to the Victorian class action legislation that went to the
High Court, where the constitutional validity of the legislation was upheld.138
While the case was on foot, loss adjusters for the respondents approached
various class members directly and told them that the case would be appealed,
that this would take several years, and that they could get 60 per cent immediately or risk getting nothing in several years. By the time the plaintiffs succeeded

135

136
137
138

to which the author there refers. In effect, there is a certification process in Australia, albeit with
a different name (or names) — for example, applications under Federal Court Act ss 33C and
33N.
See Courtney (2002) 122 FCR 168, 189 (Sackville J); King v GIO Australia Holdings (2000)
100 FCR 209. In Courtney, a regulation order was made setting out the manner in which the
defendants could communicate with class members. An interesting avenue of research may be to
enquire into the cases in which such regulation orders have been made, and then to enquire of
defendants whether they pursued their right to communicate with the class members as described in the order.
See generally Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (1999) 94 FCR 167; Johnson Tiles Pty
Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564.
See, eg, Tasfast Air Freight Pty Ltd v Mobil Oil Australia Ltd [2002] VSC 457 (Unreported,
Bongiorno J, 22 October 2002).
See Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1.
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in the High Court, many of the claims had been settled for less than full value.139
If the loss adjusters had been required to communicate the offer to settle for 60
per cent of the value of claims to the class lawyers, those class lawyers could
have communicated the offers to the class members in a way that would have
been more balanced and that would have drawn attention to the strengths as well
as the weaknesses of the claims. This might have encouraged more class
members to remain in the class action. The best response to this risk is for courts
and class lawyers to ensure that communications from respondents are accurate
and balanced.140
Finally, allowing individual offers of settlement is contrary to one of the central aims of the class action legislation, because it has the potential to reduce the
size of the class to a point where it becomes uneconomical to continue. The
cost–benefit analysis conducted by class members, the class representative and
the class lawyers at the beginning of the action can be altered significantly if
respondents are allowed to ‘pick off’ class members after the opt out date has
passed. 141 No individual shareholder or other claimant is likely to be able to
spend the large sums necessary to pursue an individual claim; his or her claim
can only be pursued in the context of a class action.142 The costs incurred in
pursuing a class action can only be met if there is a large class with significant
damages entitlements from which any solicitor–client costs incurred by the
applicant’s lawyers can be paid. Without such a class the applicant cannot be
reimbursed for the fees that he or she has incurred for the benefit of the class. If
the applicant’s lawyer has conducted the case on a conditional fee basis, this
diminishes the economic viability of pursuing the class action. If the respondent
is able to reduce the class by settling with class members individually after the
expiry of the opt out period, the economic viability of the class action may be
lost and persons who would otherwise be able to make a claim will be unable to
do so. This defeats the purpose of the legislation, which is one reason why it has
been prohibited by some courts in the United States.143
139 For those who stayed within the class action, the predictions regarding delay were accurate. The
140

141

142
143

respondent unsuccessfully argued its jurisdictional case in the Supreme Court of Victoria, the
Court of Appeal and then the High Court, which took several years.
The claim of some respondents that they are free to communicate directly with group members
is overstated, and even those respondents who have described the right broadly have also acknowledged that they must approach such communications with a great deal of care: see Brooke
Davie, ‘Guidelines for Communications with Unrepresented Group Members’ (2002) 13 Australian Product Liability Reporter 89; Stuart Clark, ‘Class Action Defendants Are Free To Communicate with Class Members’ (2002) 13 Australian Product Liability Reporter 33.
Grave and Adams express the view that ‘respondents have sought to, on occasion, compromise
those group members’ claims that are most likely to succeed or that are the larger claims in terms
of quantum. The intended effect is to remove or diminish the applicant’s prospects of recovering
costs’: Grave and Adams, above n 125, 458. Such tactics may have a chilling effect on the
growth of the class action jurisdiction by adding to the list of factors that discourage lawyers
from taking up these cases, especially on a ‘no win, no fee’ basis.
See, eg, Guglielmin v Trescowthick [No 2] (2005) 220 ALR 515, 533 (Mansfield J).
See, eg, Resnick v American Dental Association, 95 FRD 372 (ND Ill, 1982); Kleiner v First
National Bank of Atlanta, 751 F 2d 1193, 1207 fn 28 (Vance CJ) (11th Cir, 1985). However, there
appears to be no consensus among American judges on this issue: see Vince Morabito, ‘Judicial
Supervision of Individual Settlement with Class Members in Australia, Canada and the United
States’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 663, 717–20.
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Another significant effect of allowing respondents to pick off some class
members by settling their claims after the opt out date is the increased burden of
class legal costs which may ultimately fall on the remaining class members. The
class members who individually settle may take the benefit of the litigation that
has generated the settlement offer without being required to meet the same share
of the legal costs incurred by the remaining class members. 144 Taken to its
logical conclusion, the class action brought by the representative party may
generate settlement offers being made by the respondent to all the class members, yet the representative party may be forced to meet all the costs of the
proceedings without obtaining a fair share of these costs from other class
members.145
One of the factors upon which respondents tend to rely to justify their right to
communicate with unrepresented class members is that it is permitted by the
traditional rules of professional conduct.146 In our view this is another example
of the unsuitability of using traditional rules to determine the manner in which
class actions can best proceed. Although traditional rules of professional conduct
may have permitted a lawyer to contact an unrepresented party, or respondents or
their agents to contact group members directly, those rules were devised long
before class action regimes were introduced. For the reasons previously explained, there are sound reasons for circumscribing contact between respondents
and group members to a greater extent in class action proceedings than in other
civil actions.
Two issues should be included in any contemplated reform of settlement
procedures. First, endorsing Rachael Mulheron’s suggestion, is a need for greater
clarity regarding the criteria that courts use to determine whether settlement
agreements will be approved. 147 Second, settlement communications between
respondents and class members should take place only through the class lawyer.
Even if this reform is not implemented, clearer guidelines are required on the
extent to which respondents may communicate directly with class members.
I The Opt Out Notice
The consent of a person to be a class member is not required.148 Instead, eligible parties are deemed to remain class members unless they opt out149 before a
144 See Grave and Adams, above n 125, 371–2 for discussion of Sackville J’s comments about

‘freeloaders’ in Courtney (2002) 122 FCR 168.

145 A similar though not identical problem has arisen in the United States in the context of

individual plaintiffs withdrawing from the class after considerable work has been done by the
class lawyers. One solution that has been devised in such cases is for the withdrawing parties to
contribute to the costs incurred to the point at which they have withdrawn. The rationale is that if
they pursue individual actions, they will have the benefit of the work (for example, discovery)
that has been conducted in the class action: see generally Coffee, above n 19, 915–17, 925.
146 This argument was successfully advanced by the respondents in Courtney (2002) 122 FCR 168.
Sackville J accepted that there is nothing to prevent communication with group members, providing that such communication ‘does not infringe any other law or ethical constraint (such as a
professional conduct rule which requires solicitors to communicate with a represented group
member through the latter’s own legal representatives)’: at 183.
147 See Mulheron, above n 47.
148 Federal Court Act ss 33E, 33J.
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date fixed by the court.150 Class members are notified, usually by publication in
newspapers, of the commencement of the proceedings and their right to opt out.
The form and content of opt out notices must be approved by the court and are
specific to each case.151 However, opt out notices are now very similar.
The main challenges faced by applicants are disputes about the wording of
such notices and the costs associated with their publication. One common
respondent tactic is to seek to have the notice worded so that it is biased against
participation in the class action. In the GIO class action, for example, some
respondents sought to set out all of the negative consequences for class members
if they stayed in the proceedings and none of the positive consequences of
remaining in the class.152 Another recent decision illustrates that this tactic is still
employed on occasion.153
In large class actions, the cost of notices can be prohibitive.154 In the Esso
class action, Esso Australia Pty Ltd proposed a notice regime that required
multiple large advertisements to be taken out in newspapers throughout Australia. To do so would have cost the applicant more than $400 000.155 As with other
aspects of class action litigation explored in this article, robust judicial supervision has proved to be the most effective way to control the opt out notice process
and the time and costs issues that can arise.
J The Representative Party
A significant practical difficulty in class actions is finding a group member
who is willing to be the representative party rather than just an ordinary group
member. Both the federal and Victorian class action regimes provide that, except
in limited circumstances, costs orders can only be made against the representative party or the respondent and not against the group members.156 The exposure
of a group member to costs liability is therefore so advantageous compared to
that of a representative party that almost all claimants would elect to be group
members. Any prospective class member must be advised of these costs issues,
and any prospective representative party must be advised of the costs advantage
enjoyed by a class member over a class representative. When such advice is
given, people who were otherwise keen to bring a class action will often decline
to be the representative party because of concerns about an adverse costs
149
150
151
152

153
154
155

156

Federal Court Act s 33E, with the exception of persons described in Federal Court Act s 33E(2).
Federal Court Act s 33J.
Federal Court Act s 33X.
King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2000] FCA 1869 (Unreported, Moore J, 20 December
2000); King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2001] FCA 270 (Unreported, Sackville, Hely and
Stone JJ, 20 March 2001).
Petrusevski v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd [2003] FCA 1056 (Unreported, Sackville J,
8 October 2003).
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 284 (Unreported, Gillard J,
17 August 2001).
Affidavit of N J Styant-Browne, filed on behalf of the applicants, Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso
Australia Pty Ltd (Sworn on 22 September 1999) [20]. See also King v GIO Australia Holdings
Ltd [2000] FCA 1869 (Unreported, Moore J, 20 December 2000) [3], [13], [20]–[22].
See Federal Court Act ss 43(1A), 33Q(3), 33R(2) and the equivalent Victorian provisions:
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 33ZD, 33Q(3), 33R(2).
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order.157 Concern about the potential negative impact of the costs shifting rules
figured prominently in the deliberations of the ALRC.158 One expert commentator has observed that it is difficult to see ‘who, properly advised, would agree to
become a representative plaintiff’ because of the adverse costs rule.159
A further concern sometimes expressed in discussions about class actions is
that applicants’ solicitors ‘invariably select a man or woman of straw as the
representative applicant [so as to] ensure that there is often no prospect of a
respondent recovering their costs.’160 The reality of class action litigation reveals
that these concerns are ill-founded. A consideration of a number of Australian
class action cases reveals that applicant’s lawyers do not select representative
parties because of their lack of resources and resulting inability to pay any
adverse costs order.
In the GIO class action, for example, the applicant was an ordinary working
Australian with approximately $150 000 equity in his family home in suburban
Sydney.161 In Spangaro v Corporate Investment Australia Funds Management
Ltd, 162 the applicant was a businessman with significant assets. In
Bray v Hoffman First Instance,163 the initial applicant was an employed teacher
with significant assets, and the second applicant was a pensioner who purchased
a house in her name whilst the case was on foot and had equity of approximately
$70 000 in that home.164 Indeed, the final substituted applicants in that case were
three Australian companies of significant worth. In the Esso class action the first
applicant was a large tile company with a multi-million dollar turnover.165 In all
of these cases it would probably have been possible to find a woman or man of
straw to be the representative party, but in none was that strategy adopted.
Even if such a strategy had been employed, there is nothing in either the legislation or ethical and professional conduct rules that places an obligation on an
applicant’s legal advisers to choose a representative party of means. In
Cook v Pasminco Ltd [No 2],166 for example, the respondents sought an order for
costs against the applicant’s solicitors personally for various reasons, including
that they had strategically chosen a representative applicant who was an undischarged bankrupt. In the absence of evidence as to how the applicant was
selected, Lindgren J did not draw an inference that the solicitors invited her to be

157 In the GIO class action, approximately 70–80 of the people who telephoned the eventual class

lawyers regarding their losses were asked whether they would agree to be the lead plaintiff in the
contemplated litigation before one agreed to assume that role.

158 See Grave and Adams, above n 125, 446–7.
159 Garry D Watson, ‘Class Actions: The Canadian Experience’ (2001) 11 Duke Journal of

Comparative and International Law 269, 275.

160 ALRC, above n 22, 486.
161 King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2000] FCA 617 (Unreported, Moore J, 12 May 2000)

[4]–[8].
(2003) 47 ACSR 285.
(2002) 118 FCR 1.
Bray v Hoffman Appeal (2003) 130 FCR 317, 323–5 (Carr J).
See Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 27 (Unreported, Gillard J, 20
February 2003).
166 (2000) 107 FCR 44.
162
163
164
165
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the named applicant because of her status as an undischarged bankrupt. His
Honour went on to make the following observations:
faced with a number of potential representative parties, solicitors are not
obliged to make a choice in the interests of the prospective respondent. No
doubt a variety of factors may lead to one person rather than another becoming
[the] representative party, such as: the proximity of the person to the solicitors’
office; ease of communication between the solicitors and the person; degree of
interest and involvement; likely performance as a witness; the facts of the individual cases.
Assume now that one prospective representative party is a person whose means
appear to be sufficient to meet, wholly or partially, an adverse costs order,
while another is almost insolvent. Solicitors are not subject to any legal or ethical obligation to choose the former. Certainly they could not be criticised for
choosing the latter. It might even be suggested (I express no view) that they
owe a duty to the former to choose the latter, unless other factors suggest a different choice!167

The successful class actions to date in Australia have been possible because,
notwithstanding these difficulties, some claimants have been prepared to take on
the significant risks associated with being the representative party.
K Summary
Adverse costs orders, unclear threshold requirements, evasive posturing, and
unresolved class communication issues continue to number among the main
challenges faced by applicants in Australian class actions. We have analysed
these challenges from the perspective of the access to justice and efficiency aims
of the class action regime and have made some recommendations for change.
Although we have identified a number of negative developments, we have also
shown that many judges are willing to reject traditional approaches and attitudes
in favour of the assertive case management role that is necessary if the aims of
the legislation are to be achieved.
The following Part discusses the rise of litigation funding and its potential
impact on the conduct of class actions in Australia.
V T H E R O L E O F I N S T I T U T I O N A L L I T I G AT I O N
FUNDERS IN AUSTRALIA
In the Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court report, the Law Reform
Commission recommended that third party funding of class actions be permitted,
provided that any consideration for such funding would not be a share of the
proceeds or the subject of the action.168 The report explicitly acknowledged the
capacity of third party funding to ‘enabl[e] less wealthy individuals or groups to
167 Ibid 49–50. Stone J later granted leave to appeal from the order of Lindgren J that the applicant’s

solicitors pay the respondents’ costs, albeit on another ground: Cook v Pasminco Ltd [2001] FCA
1277 (Unreported, Stone J, 7 September 2001).

168 Law Reform Commission, above n 2, 129.
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gain access to the courts’ as one of the factors justifying such funding. 169
However, this was one of the recommendations in the report that was not enacted
by the Parliament. Nevertheless, at least since 2003, commercial litigation
funders have been prepared to fund Part IVA class actions.170 They have increasingly been recognised by courts as making positive contributions towards the
aims of the legislation and as accommodating the commercial realities of class
action litigation.171
Early decisions invoked the doctrines of maintenance and champerty to invalidate litigation funding agreements with commercial funders. 172 However, this
resistance to litigation funding has since given way to judicial endorsement of
the constructive role that it can play in the conduct of litigation. The leading case
is Fostif Appeal. 173 At first instance, the funding agreement was found to be
invalid as champertous. The Court of Appeal acknowledged a need for change in
attitude toward litigation funders:
These changes in attitude to funders have been influenced by concerns about
access to justice and heightened awareness of the cost of litigation. Governments have promoted the legislative changes in response to spiralling costs of
legal aid. Courts have recognised these trends and the matters driving them.
‘Ambulance chasing’ still has negative connotations in many quarters, but it is
now widely recognised that there are some types of claim that will simply
never get off the ground unless traditional attitudes are modified. These include
cases involving complex scientific and legal issues. The largely factual account
in the book and film A Civil Action has demonstrated the social utility of
funded proceedings, the financial risks assumed by funders, and the potential
conflicts of interest as between group members in mass tort claims propounding difficult actions against deep-pocketed and determined defendants.174

169 Ibid. The Law Reform Commission gave as examples of third party funders, trade unions,

170

171
172

173
174

consumer groups and environmental organisations. Recent judicial comments in Australia endorsing third party funding by commercial litigation funders have also relied on the access to
justice rationale: see, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, Welcome to The Honourable Chief Justice
Martin (Supreme Court of Western Australia, Martin CJ, 1 May 2006) 19 <http://www.supreme
court.wa.gov.au/publications/pdf/WelcomeTranscript.pdf>; QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty
Ltd [No 3] (2005) 219 ALR 1, 14 (French J); Fostif Appeal (2005) 63 NSWLR 203, 226, 227
(Mason P); Campbells Cash & Carry v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ,
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ, 30 August 2006) [142] (Kirby J).
For example, the publicly-listed litigation funder IMF (Australia) Ltd is presently funding
shareholders to obtain redress for alleged misleading and deceptive conduct in actions against
Aristocrat Leisure Ltd, Concept Sports Ltd, Sons of Gwalia Ltd and ION Ltd: IMF (Australia)
Ltd, Funded Cases (2006) <http://www.imf.com.au/page.asp?content=fundedcases>.
See, eg, Fostif Appeal (2005) 63 NSWLR 203; QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd [No 3]
(2005) 219 ALR 1, 14 (French J).
For a description of the development of the law of maintenance and champerty, see the judgment
of Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006]
HCA 41 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ,
30 August 2006) [68]–[82].
(2005) 63 NSWLR 203.
Ibid 226 (Mason P).
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Mason P observed that these changes and the principles on which they are based
‘were reflective of goals consonant with the Overriding Purpose Rule … and
contemporary attitudes to civil litigation.’175
The effect of Fostif Appeal is that defendants have been confined to a narrow
scope within which they can challenge the participation of a commercial
litigation funder.176 According to Mason P, a court would not be concerned about
the arrangements between an applicant and a litigation funder unless those
arrangements amounted to an abuse of process. They would only constitute an
abuse if ‘they have corrupted or have a tendency to corrupt the processes of the
Court in the particular litigation.’177 Barring such circumstances, it is ‘simply no
business of a defendant to be taking up the cudgels on behalf of the funded
litigants.’178
In their submissions in support of their applications for special leave to appeal
to the High Court, the applicants challenged this ‘taking up the cudgels’ comment, describing it as ‘the notion that a respondent vexed with a champertous
proceeding no longer has standing to complain of that circumstance.’179 Among
the issues that the High Court was asked to consider were: whether the Court of
Appeal erred in holding that champerty no longer exists in modern law; 180
whether the public policy consideration underlying the torts of maintenance and
champerty received inadequate attention from the Court of Appeal; and the
constitutional question whether, given the participation of a litigation funder in
the case, there was a ‘controversy’ of the kind required for the exercise of the
judicial power of the Commonwealth.181
175 Ibid. The reference to the overriding purpose rule is to the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)

176
177
178
179
180

181

s 56(1), which states: ‘The overriding purpose of this Act and of rules of court, in their application to civil proceedings, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in
the proceedings.’
See also Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 455 (Unreported, Sundberg J,
22 April 2005).
See Fostif Appeal (2005) 63 NSWLR 203, 229. For an endorsement of this aspect of the case,
see the comments of Stone J in Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394, 415.
See also QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd [No 3] (2005) 219 ALR 1, 3, 12–16 (French J),
where his Honour notes the ability of the applicants to protect their own interests.
Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2005] HCATrans 777, 7 (A C Archibald, 30
September 2005).
In response to this submission, McHugh J stated:
But, Mr Archibald, this is all about public policy. The judges made this particular aspect of
public policy and the judges are entitled to change it. The reason for the change is that the
courts have been influenced by concerns about access to justice and a heightened awareness
of the cost of litigation. In those circumstances the view is taken by the Court of Appeal that
what they referred to as the modern law in respect of champerty does not make this either
champerty or an abuse of process.
Ibid (McHugh J).
The ‘controversy’ issue was raised in Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Trendlen Pty Ltd, which was
heard with the Fostif special leave application: Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd
[2005] HCATrans 777, 6, 22 (Gleeson CJ, 30 September 2005). Mobil Oil Australia Pty
Ltd v Trendlen Pty Ltd involved the participation of a litigation funder in a representative proceeding in New South Wales to recover petrol licence fees. Counsel for Trendlen Pty Ltd submitted that the effect of participation of a litigation funder in this case was ‘the conversion of rights
into instruments of commerce’: at 7 (N C Hutley). A similar argument was made unsuccessfully
in Aristocrat (2005) 147 FCR 394, 416 (Stone J), where Aristocrat Leisure Ltd failed to establish
that the proceeding was an abuse of process.
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The respondents argued that the appropriate test was whether there had been
an abuse of process and that, far from abusing court processes, the participation
of the litigation funder actually assisted them. They also submitted that as this
was a representative action, the intense judicial supervision that occurs in such
cases would be sufficient to monitor and address any issues of improper use of
court process. Counsel for Fostif Pty Ltd cited examples of class actions in
which issues that arose regarding the participation of a litigation funder were
addressed and dealt with at first instance and by intermediate courts.182
Leave to appeal was granted and a review of the High Court transcript reveals
the Court’s sensitivity to the role of class actions and commercial litigation
funding in addressing access to justice issues.183 It also exhibits caution about
intervening in individual cases without more evidence about the nature of the
funding arrangements, and awareness of the significant public policy issues
raised by the appeals. In its recent decision, a majority of the High Court —
comprising Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Kirby and Crennan JJ — held that
there was nothing about the litigation funding arrangement in that case that was
either an abuse of process or contrary to public policy.184
These decisions reveal strong judicial endorsement of the capacity of commercial litigation funding to enhance access to justice. The judgments also reflect a
realisation that complex class litigation entails significant commercial risks, and
an awareness that funders of litigation can make positive contributions to its
responsible conduct and management. As French J stated in QPSX Ltd v Ericsson
Australia Pty Ltd [No 3]:
Where [litigation funding agreements] involve the creation of budgets by funders knowledgeable in the costs of litigation it may inject a welcome element
of commercial objectivity into the way in which such budgets are framed and
the efficiency with which the litigation is conducted. The formulation of a
budget limiting the amount of funding provided is, of course, different from the
assumption by the funder of control of the conduct of the litigation. The court is
in no position to pass definitive judgments on questions of the overall economic benefits to be derived from legitimate litigation funding arrangements.
But the development of modern funding services in commercial litigation may
be seen as indicative of a need in the market place to which those developments
are legitimate responses. It is not for the court to judge them as contrary to the
182 See Clairs Keeley (a firm) v Treacy (2003) 28 WAR 139; Clairs Keeley (a firm) v Treacy (2004)

29 WAR 479; Clairs Keeley (a firm) v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86 (Unreported, Steytler P, Roberts-Smith and McLure JJA, 10 May 2005). For a recent consideration of these cases, see Carman Yung, ‘Litigation Funding: Officious Intermeddling or Access to Justice?’ (2005) 15 Journal of Judicial Administration 61, 74–80.
183 See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2005] HCATrans 777 (30 September
2005).
184 See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ,
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ, 30 August 2006) [88], where Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ stated:
The appellants’ submissions can be seen to fasten upon Firmstones’ [the litigation funder]
seeking out those who may have claims, and offering terms which not only gave Firmstones
control of the litigation but also would yield, so Firmstones hoped and expected, a significant
profit to Firmstones. But none of these elements, alone or in combination, warrant condemnation as being contrary to public policy or leading to any abuse of process.
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public interest unless it be shown that a particular arrangement threatens to
compromise the integrity of the court’s processes in some way.185

Support for the growing role of commercial litigation funders has also come
from the legal profession. The Law Council of Australia published a submission
in favour of litigation funding in which it stated that such funding provides an
important means of improving access to justice and should be encouraged.186
The Council endorsed national regulations to protect consumers and create
certainty for litigation funders. These views have been reiterated by the President
of the Council, who encouraged the state and territory Attorneys-General to
‘strike an appropriate balance between ensuring consumers are protected and
facilitating the role of litigation funders in the judicial process’.187
The Law Institute of Victoria has echoed the recommendations put forward by
the Law Council of Australia. In a recent comment on general issues regarding
the costs of litigation, the Chief Executive Officer of the Law Institute of
Victoria noted the decline in legal aid funding for civil cases during the past 15
years. He observed:
This creates a substantial access to justice issue for many individuals and businesses with meritorious cases who do not pursue them because they simply
cannot afford to bring the action. While we can complain and protest about this
situation and insist that additional funding be made available for legal aid to
fund civil matters, the priority will be criminal matters.
In these circumstances it is timely for the legal profession, governments and
other bodies to look for other solutions to this problem. The growth of litigation
funders is to be encouraged and it is clear that many cases would not have been
pursued but for the involvement of funders.188

There have been some concerns expressed that support for commercial litigation funding may give rise to speculative claims.189 While the development of
commercial funding of class actions has the capacity to increase the number of
185 (2005) 219 ALR 1, 14. See also Jamie Richardson and Michael O’Brien, ‘Men in Tight Financial

186
187
188
189

Situations: Litigation Funding in the 21st Century’ (2005) 79(12) Law Institute Journal 26, 27,
where the authors discuss the capacity of commercial litigation funding to enhance access to
justice, and continue ‘but beyond its obvious appeal to the impecunious, litigation funding may
also offer a risk management tool for plaintiffs wishing to lay off downside litigation risks in
return for a percentage of potential returns’.
In Spatialinfo Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2005] FCA 455 (Unreported, Sundberg J,
22 April 2005), a litigation funding agreement required the applicant to notify the funders of the
terms of any proposed settlement, and authorised the funder to request that the applicant obtain
the advice of senior counsel whether settlement should occur and as to its terms. Sundberg J
found that this was not inappropriate or excessive control, but ‘merely protective of the funders’
investment’: at [32]. Similarly, Sundberg J found that the funder’s right to terminate ‘is an almost unavoidable feature of a litigation funding agreement. … [T]he funders would be very
unlikely to fund a case without a right to terminate’: at [33].
See Submission to Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, in response to Litigation Funding
in Australia, 14 September 2006 (Law Council of Australia).
John North, ‘Litigation Funding: Much To Be Achieved with the Right Approach’ (2005) 43
Law Society Journal 66, 69.
John Cain, ‘Aiding Access to Justice’ (2005) 79(12) Law Institute Journal 6, 6, where the author
endorses a scheme of moderate regulation of litigation funders.
See Priest, ‘Class Actions Put Heat on Executives’, above n 20; Marcus Priest, ‘Class Actions
Diluting Disputes’, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney), 26 August 2005, 56.
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class actions brought, there is little chance that the increase will include unmeritorious or speculative claims. The evidence indicates that litigation funders are
very careful about the risks they assume; they gain nothing from funding and
losing bad cases. It is reasonable to expect a publicly-listed litigation funder,
with obligations to its own shareholders, or other private companies with
obligations to their investors, to be careful not to embark upon speculative
litigation. Evidence of their approach confirms that this expectation is reasonable.190
In the absence of commercial litigation funding, the result is that fewer solicitors are available to claimants. This is due to the limited number of law firms
with the size, experience and preparedness to take on class action litigation on a
contingency basis. Few firms could bear the cost and fewer still have shown that
they are willing to do so. We are not suggesting that commercial litigation
funding will ameliorate all issues of access to justice faced by class action
claimants. Commercial litigation funders handle very large cases, leaving many
smaller companies and individuals who will continue to face barriers to the
enforcement of their legal rights. Other approaches and innovations are possible,
including: state-funded and not-for-profit litigation funding; litigation insurance;
and a relaxation of the rules regarding contingency fees. These options were
among the suggestions made by the Law Council of Australia in response to the
recent debate about litigation funding and access to justice.191 Access to justice is
undeniably a central aim of class action legislation, and commercial funding is
no panacea for that objective. However, a robust commercial litigation funding
market does represent a positive step towards its attainment.
VI C O N C L U S I O N
In this article we have considered the development of class action litigation in
Australia from the perspective of actual and potential applicants. We have
identified the main factors that, in our view, are hampering the regime’s continued development. Chief among these is the satellite litigation that has become an
entrenched feature of class action proceedings and greatly increased their cost
and duration. We have also described the outmoded and unsubstantiated attitudes, still prevailing in some quarters, that equate the pursuit of class actions
with ambulance chasing, and that predict without examination or evidence a
flood of litigation. Finally, we have identified examples of how rigid adherence
to traditional litigation practices can impede rather than enhance access to justice
and efficiency in class action litigation. Finally, we have made some constructive
suggestions about issues that should be included on a reform agenda.
190 Priest, ‘Class Actions Put Heat on Executives’, above n 20.
191 North, above n 187, 68–9. See also Chris Dale, ‘An End of Year Challenge’ (2004) 78(12) Law

Institute Journal 4, 4:
Whatever may be said about the cost of litigation, one thing is for sure, there must be more
inventive ways of funding it. … [W]hat else is available to meet the cost of litigation and
overcome the suggestion that, in the superior courts at least, litigation is only available for the
rich, very poor, large corporates or governments?
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Approximately 10 years ago, one judge expressed the following view of the
role, and the potential, of class action proceedings:
Representative proceedings, especially those involving more than one respondent, need close judicial supervision. … The procedure has the potential to handle cases more efficiently than otherwise and to resolve cases that might otherwise remain unresolved. Its use will often require innovative answers to practical problems. Imaginative case management, and sensible attitudes by both
bar and bench, will ultimately demonstrate that the representative proceeding
provides a valuable addition to traditional procedures.192

These comments are as relevant now as they were when originally made. They
capture the essential role of the judge in the conduct of class action proceedings,
and emphasise the need for imagination and innovation. Perhaps most significantly, they remind us of the capacity of class actions to ‘resolve cases that might
otherwise remain unresolved.’193

192 Justice Murray Wilcox, ‘Representative Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia: A

Progress Report’ (1996) 15 Australian Bar Review 91, 97–8.

193 Ibid.

